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Interested in getting published in the Gettysburg College 
Journal of the Civil War Era? 
 
If you or anyone you know has written an undergraduate 
paper in the past five years about the Civil War Era or its 
lasting memory and meets the following categories and 
requirements, then please consider visiting our website at 
http://cupola.gettysburg.edu/gcjwe/ and enter your work for 
consideration for next year’s publication. 
  
Requirements and Categories for Publication:  
 
Submissions should be typed in 12-point Times New 
Roman font and submitted as a Word document 
   
1. Academic Essays: We are interested in original 
research with extensive use of primary and secondary 
sources. Possible Topics include but are not limited to 
military history, social history, race, reconstruction, 
memory, reconciliation, politics, the home front, 
etc. 6,000 words or less. 
 
2. Book Reviews: Any non-fiction Civil War related book 
published in the last two years. Authors should have 
knowledge of the relevant literature to review. 700 
words or less. 
 
3. Historical Non-fiction Essays: This category is for non-
fiction works regarding the Civil War that are not 
necessarily of an academic nature. Examples of this 
include essays in public history of the war, study of the 
re-enactment culture, current issues in the Civil War 
field such as the sesquicentennial, etc. Creativity is 
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encouraged in this category as long as it remains a non-
fiction piece. 2,000 to 6,000 words. 
 
 
Any student with an interest in the Civil War may submit a 
piece, including graduate students as long as the work 
submitted is undergraduate work written within the past 
five years. If your submission is selected, your work will be 
published online and in a print journal, which you will 
receive a copy of for your own enjoyment. 
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A Letter from the Editors 
 
We are thrilled to present you with the fifth volume 
of the Gettysburg College Journal of the Civil War Era. It 
has been our pleasure to select the best of the submissions 
we received for this year’s issue. Although we could not 
accept every submission, the opportunity to read through a 
fine array of undergraduate work allowed us new insights 
into the Civil War Era and the way in which it is being 
interpreted by budding young scholars.  
We owe a great breadth of gratitude to our devoted 
team of associate editors:  Heather Clancy (’15), Brianna 
Kirk (’15), Bobby Novak (’15), Steven Semmel (’16), 
Thomas Nank (’16), Anika Jensen (’18), and Julia Sippel 
(’18). In addition, we would like to extend our thanks to 
our advisor, Dr. Peter Carmichael, for providing guidance 
and support throughout the editorial process. Naturally, we 
are also indebted to our predecessors who served on the 
editorial board in years past and who blazed a trail for us to 
follow as we prepared this year’s issue for publication. 
This volume is comprised of three academic essays, 
our first-ever battle narrative, and a book review. Together, 
these pieces span the breadth of the field – from traditional 
and cultural military history to social and cultural history. 
The issue opens with “‘Servants, Obey Your Masters’: 
Southern Representations of the Religious Lives of Slaves” 
by Lindsey K. D. Wedow, who argues that the Southern 
justification of slavery relied in no small part upon 
contradictory assumptions about slaves’ dependence on 
their masters for access to Christianity. In “Men and 
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Machines:  The Psychological Impact of Gunboats on the 
Fort Henry and Donelson Campaign,” S. Marianne Johnson 
examines how the fear and awe inspired by ironclad 
gunboats was disproportionate to their efficacy in brown-
water warfare. In his piece, Peter Bautz refutes the notion 
that Union veterans were passive or complicit in allowing 
the memory of the Civil War to be hijacked by 
reconciliationists in “The Memory of Battle Surrounds You 
Once Again: Iowa Grand Army of the Republic Reunions 
and the Formation of a Pro-Union Nationalism, 1886-
1949.”  In the first battle narrative ever published in our 
journal, Ryan T. Quint traces Ambrose Burnside’s return to 
the Army of the Potomac and discusses the role played by 
the Ninth Army Corps during the Battle of Spotsylvania 
Court House. We close with associate editor Brianna Kirk’s 
review of William A. Blair’s 2014 monograph With Malice 
Toward Some:  Treason and Loyalty in the Civil War Era.  
It is our hope that this journal will provide you, our 
reader, with a sense of the great work being produced by 
the undergraduate students who represent the future of the 
field. We are thus incredibly proud of the 2015 volume of 
the Gettysburg College Journal of the Civil War Era and 
hope you enjoy the outstanding work within. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
Bryan G. Caswell, Gettysburg College Class of 2015 
Kevin P. Lavery, Gettysburg College Class of 2016 
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“Servants, Obey Your Masters”: Southern 
Representations of the Religious Lives of Slaves 
 
Lindsey K. Wedow 
 
In 1841 white members of the First Baptist Church 
in Richmond, Virginia constructed a new church building. 
The old church building, which had previously housed a 
multiracial congregation, was purchased by the 
congregation’s black members and effectively became 
known as the First African Baptist Church.  White 
members of the First Baptist Church in Richmond had been 
uncomfortable for some time with the fact that white 
Christians were a minority at the church. It was therefore 
determined that the white and black members of the 
congregation would disjoin and worship in separate 
buildings.1 Robert Ryland, minister thereafter of the First 
African Baptist Church in Richmond described this split, 
explaining that  
 
Some very fastidious people did not like to 
resort to a church where so many colored folks 
congregated, and this was thought to operate 
against the growth of the white portion of the 
audience. The discipline and culture of the 
colored people, too, were felt by the pastor to be 
a heavy burden to his mind, requiring more time 
and attention than he could give them, and yet 
satisfy the expectations of the whites. After long 
and mature consultation, it was decided to build 
a new and more tasteful edifice for the whites, 
                                                          
1 Rev. Robert Ryland, Reminiscences of the First African Church in 
Richmond (VA: American Baptist Memorial, 1855), 262. 
Wedow 
2 
 
and to dispose of the old one to the blacks, for 
their exclusive accommodation.2 
 
This split of a community of worshippers into two on the 
basis of race reveals much about the relationship between 
white and black Christians in the years leading up to and 
during the American Civil War. Following Nat Turner’s 
Rebellion in 1831 it was determined by the majority of 
slaveholders and proslavery individuals that allowing 
slaves to hold religious gatherings without the supervision 
of white persons was too dangerous. Specifically, the fear 
was that slaves would use religious meetings as a cover for 
planning further rebellion. Yet still feeling it a duty to 
provide slaves with religious instruction, it became 
common practice for Southern churches to allow 
multiracial congregations.  
Thus, on the one hand, the founding of the First 
African Baptist Church in Richmond looks like an excellent 
opportunity for black Christians to gain their own church 
building and some religious independence. Yet what this 
instance also reveals is the strained paternalism that was the 
foundation of proslavery Christianity. By analyzing 
proslavery evangelical representations of the religious 
instruction of slaves we begin to understand how 
proslavery evangelicals truly believed themselves to be 
doing the work of God. When the institution of slavery 
came under attack from antislavery evangelicals and 
abolitionists, proslavery evangelicals constructed an 
elaborate defense based on their perception of themselves 
as God’s chosen actors. This defense, and the strong 
religious zeal that informed it, helped to bring about the 
American Civil War and to perpetuate the conflict. Each 
                                                          
2 Ryland, Reminiscences of the First African Church, 262-263. 
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side felt that they were justified by God almighty and that 
they had a duty to fight to the bitter end.  
This paper examines sources ranging from sermons 
by proslavery evangelicals and articles in proslavery 
religious periodicals, to books published by proslavery 
evangelicals and the public records of societies devoted to 
the religious education of slaves. Though many of these 
sources have been examined by scholars before, they have 
not necessarily been examined with an eye to depictions of 
slave’s religious education and what those depictions have 
to say about the motives and beliefs of proslavery 
Christians. This paper contends that when read through a 
critical lens, sermons offer insight into how proslavery 
Christians used representations of the religious lives of 
slaves to construct a justification for the institution of 
slavery. When viewed in the specifically evangelical 
context of the American South, this justification reveals 
some important contradictions. First, in order to maintain a 
defense of slavery, proslavery Christians were forced to 
contradict their own belief in, and celebration of, the free 
accessibility of Christ’s salvation. Proslavery Christians, 
though they were evangelicals, represented slaves as in 
need of the mediation of white Christians in order to 
achieve salvation. This insistence on the permanent need 
for white mediation resulted in a depiction of the spiritual 
condition of slaves as constantly in a state of disrepair. 
Thus while the aid of white Christians was supposed to 
bring about the salvation of slaves, and missionaries always 
seemed to report positive spiritual improvement among 
their slave congregations, proslavery Christians also had to 
maintain a permanent position for themselves as spiritual 
instructors in order to justify slaveholding to the rest of the 
world. Therefore we find then in documents from the 
period contradictory representations of the religious lives of 
Wedow 
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slaves which are strategically crafted to serve the purposes 
of proslavery Christians.  
As famously described by David Bebbington, 
evangelicalism is marked by four distinctive elements. 
First, evangelicals practice conversionism, in which new 
believers are expected to depart with their former habits 
and completely change their lives; this is commonly called 
being “born again.”3 Secondly, evangelicals employ 
biblicism, meaning that they take the Bible as highly 
authoritative and often identify directly with the biblical 
text.4 Next, evangelicals exercise what Bebbington calls 
“crucicentrism,” which places emphasis on the saving grace 
of Christ’s death and resurrection; the salvation offered by 
Jesus is central to Protestantism in general, but is even 
more paramount for evangelicalism.5 Lastly, evangelicals 
are said to engage in activism, meaning that they choose to 
express their faith in a strikingly passionate manner. For 
this reason a great deal of emphasis is placed upon zealous 
preaching and proselytizing.6 These doctrines of 
evangelical Christianity shaped the culture of the Southern 
United States, giving rise to strict codes of honor and duty 
and a vision of the South as a place of Christian tradition.    
 Proslavery Southerners believed that God had given 
them the South and all of its prosperity as a blessing. This 
blessing included the institution of slavery. Rev. Robert 
Wightman expressed these sentiments in an 1861 sermon 
that he delivered to the congregation of the Methodist 
Episcopal Church in Yorkville, S.C. saying, 
 
                                                          
3 David Bebbington, Evangelicalism in Modern Britain: A History from 
the 1730s to the 1980s (Routledge, 2003), 8.  
4 Bebbington, Evangelicalism in Modern Britain, 10.  
5 Bebbington, Evangelicalism in Modern Britain, 13. 
6 Bebbington, Evangelicalism in Modern Britain, 15. 
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They are the gifts of God. The pillar of cloud 
dropped fertilizing dew on our soil, and the 
pillar of fire brought across the ocean the only 
tillers who could survive pestilence, and wring 
from the sod the bloom of silver and harvests of 
gold. God blessed our land, and gave to Ham the 
privilege of mitigating his “curse” by spreading 
Christianity with the labor of his hands.7 
 
Here, Wightman demonstrates the opinion held by many 
proslavery Christians that they were the chosen people of 
God and as such had a right and a duty to defend what had 
been entrusted to them. The quote also exposes how 
proslavery Christians used established beliefs about the 
inferiority and wretchedness of African peoples to justify 
their own actions. Wightman draws on the well-established 
idea that African peoples were descendants of Ham, the son 
whom Noah cursed in the book of Genesis. This served to 
take the responsibility for slavery off of proslavery 
Christians and place it on the will of God as mediated 
through the actions of Noah. This also allowed Proslavery 
Christians to claim that the argument that slavery defied 
Christianity was blasphemous since the enslavement of 
African peoples was clearly intended by God.  
Thus we see what Bebbington refers to as biblicism 
at work. The insistence on a literal interpretation of the 
Bible became perhaps the key element of the debate 
between antislavery and proslavery evangelical Christians. 
Proslavery Christians saw themselves as the chosen heirs of 
a rich, fertile promised land, much like the Israelites of the 
Old Testament. Meanwhile their Northern brethren had to 
                                                          
7  Rev. John T. Wightman, “The Glory of God: The Defense of the 
South: A Discourse Delivered in the Methodist Episcopal Church, 
South” (ME, 1871), 8.  
Wedow 
6 
 
etch out a living in the cold, harsh climates of the North. 
This fed into an established Southern Christian 
conceptualization of Southerners as the keepers of the true 
Christianity.8 Northerners, with their abolitionist and 
capitalist ideas, had strayed away from the true religion and 
subsequently had not received the same abundant blessings. 
These ideas were later shattered by the outcome of the Civil 
War, but they were central to the way in which proslavery 
evangelicals understood themselves as opposed to 
antislavery evangelicals.  Proslavery Christians also 
attempted to deflect the responsibility for slavery from 
themselves by accusing Northerners of making slavery 
necessary with their money hungry capitalist economy. 9 
 Because evangelicals understood the Bible to be 
completely authoritative it became imperative to both 
antislavery and proslavery Christians that they were able to 
prove that the Bible either did or did not sanction slavery. 
This explains the staggering volume of writing from both 
sides attempting to demonstrate how Biblical scripture 
could be used to justify their cause.10 Proslavery 
evangelicals insisted that because the Bible contains 
examples of the great men of God, such as Noah and 
Moses, holding slaves it must have meant that it was 
permissible for Southern planters to hold slaves as well. 
Proslavery evangelicals also seized on the Epistle of 
Philemon in which the apostle Paul wrote to a Christian 
man named Philemon in order to return his runaway slave, 
Onesimus. Proslavery evangelicals selectively highlighted 
that Paul was proposing to return Onesimus to Philemon 
                                                          
8 Mark Noll, The Civil War as a Theological Crisis (NC: University of 
North Carolina Press, 2006), 52. 
9 Noll. The Civil War as a Theological Crisis, 53. 
10 Albert J. Harrill, The Manumission of Slaves in Early Christianity 
(Tubingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1995), 81-82.  
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and paid little attention to the rest of the epistle in which 
Paul implored Philemon to receive Onesimus not as a slave, 
but as a brother in Christ. Proslavery Christians also 
frequently drew on verses like 1 Corinthians 7:20-24 that 
focused on the importance of being content with one’s 
station in life.11 
 The response from antislavery evangelicals could 
not be as directly literal in its interpretation. The actual 
words printed in the Bible do in fact reveal that the 
patriarchs owned slaves, and do affirm without any 
reproach that slaveholding was common practice in the 
Roman society that both Christ and later Paul inhabited. 
Because of this, some radical abolitionists such as William 
Lloyd Garrison rejected the Bible out of hand as a 
proslavery book. However, moderate antislavery 
evangelicals strove to cultivate a more nuanced biblical 
interpretation which relied on Christian humanitarianism 
for its strength.12 Thus antislavery Christians such as James 
G. Birney tried to refute proslavery evangelicals with 
logical explanations for the Bible’s lack of antislavery text. 
Birney wrote,    
 
The Savior himself said nothing in 
condemnation of slavery, although it existed in 
great aggravation while he was on earth. He said 
nothing about it, and to my apprehension, for 
this very good reason, that he did not preach to 
the Romans, or to the people of any other 
country where slavery prevailed, but to the Jews, 
among whom the abolition principles of Moses’ 
                                                          
11 The New American Bible (NY, 2011). 1 Corinthians 7:20 reads 
“Everyone should remain in the state in which he was called.” 
12 Noll, The Civil War as a Theological Crisis, 35. 
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laws had already very nearly, if not entirely 
extinguished it.13 
 
Birney went on to argue that just because the Bible 
describes the patriarchs holding slaves it did not mean that 
God ever intended for white Southerners to become 
slaveholders.  
 Birney’s letter also pointed to another enormous 
contention between proslavery and antislavery 
evangelicals. In the worldview of evangelicals every person 
was responsible for repenting and seeking reconciliation 
with Christ. Thus denying slaves the opportunity to read the 
Bible or to gain any religious instruction was as good as 
condemning them to hell. This, antislavery evangelicals 
said, was the true horror of slavery.   
 But slaves were not the only ones in danger of 
losing their souls according to antislavery Christians. 
Slaveholders were also corrupted by slavery. Being in a 
constant position of power and possessing the liberty to 
inflict punishment and pain on another human being 
inevitably caused a person to become apathetic to human 
suffering.14 Slavery also presented strong temptation 
toward vice for slaveholders, as evidenced by the immense 
number of masters who had illegitimate children with their 
female slaves. Antislavery Christians argued that slavery 
could not possibly be consistent with the gospel because 
God would never approve of an institution that bred such 
cruelty and corruption.  
 Thus the argument over slavery and the 
condemnations of the moral condition of both slaves and 
                                                          
13 James G. Birney, “Letter to Ministers and Elders, on the Sin of 
Holding Slaves, and the Duty of Immediate Emancipation”, (NY: S.W. 
Benedict and Co., 1834), 3.  
14 Birney, “Letter to Ministers and Elders”, 2. 
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slaveholders by antislavery Christians brought about the 
formation of the paternalistic slaveholding ethic. This 
debate also provided a strong impetus for the proslavery 
church to advance missionary work to slaves. If proslavery 
Christians wanted to have any ground to stand on, they had 
to prove that those who participated in the institution of 
slavery could maintain a high standard of moral conduct. In 
order to combat the accusation that slavery was detrimental 
to the souls of both slaves and slaveholders, proslavery 
Christians used the Bible to construct a paternalistic system 
in which it was taught that slaves and slaveholders each had 
duties unto one another. The basis for this system was the 
all-too-familiar idea that white Christians had a God-given 
responsibility to spread their religion and culture amongst 
the “heathen” peoples of the world.  
 As Presbyterian Reverend John C. Young stated in 
his sermon entitled “The Duty of Masters”, “The moralist 
and the Christian defend the practice of holding human 
beings in bondage, only on the ground that they are 
incompetent to govern themselves and manage their own 
interests successfully.”15 Therefore proslavery Christians 
could comfort themselves with the idea that their slaves 
were better off in the United States where they could learn 
about Christianity and how to live respectably. This 
sentiment had been expressed by Rev. William Meade of 
Virginia in 1834. His “Pastoral Letter” was reprinted and 
circulated widely in the years leading up to and during the 
Civil War. Rev. Meade wrote, 
 
                                                          
15 Rev. John C. Young, “The Duty of Masters: A Sermon Preached in 
Danville, Kentucky in 1846, and then PublishedAt the Unanimous 
Request of the Presbyterian Church, Danville (NY: John A. Gray, 
1858), 45. 
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When we remember how their captive fathers 
were brought from a land of Pagan darkness and 
cruelty to one of Christian light, and compare 
the religious advantages which their descendants 
may have, with the horrible superstitions which 
yet prevail in Africa, there is a pleasing 
consolation in the thought that, notwithstanding 
much of evil in their present condition, great 
spiritual good may result to their unhappy race 
through the knowledge of a Redeemer. But this 
must be done through the instrumentality of 
man; and it becomes us as Christians to inquire 
how far we are concurring with the designs of 
Providence and seeking to promote this most 
desirable object.16 
 
 This quote from Rev. Meade reveals that the 
underlying principal of the slaveholding ethic was that 
slavery was ultimately redemptive to the souls of slaves. 
Proslavery Christians drew their support for this claim from 
“biblical stories of the curse of Ham and the punishment of 
Cain.”17 The majority of white Christians understood little 
to nothing of African cultures, but as Rev. Meade 
demonstrates they assumed that African religions were 
nothing but evil superstition and that practicing them was a 
sign of ignorance. Previously white discomfort with 
African religions had been a large problem. By the time the 
Civil War took place the majority of slaves in the United 
States had been born and raised in the United States. 
Though a large number of slaves were members of an 
                                                          
16 William Meade, “Pastoral Letter of the Right Reverend William 
Meade” (VA: Convocation of Central Virginia 1853), 13. 
17 David B. Chesebrough, ed. “God Ordained This War”: Sermons on 
the Sectional Crisis (SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1991), 
147. 
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evangelical church, white Christians still characterized their 
slaves as practitioners of traditional African religions or at 
least as being heavily influenced by them.18 This made it 
easier to claim that slaves were naturally given to a 
heathenish nature and thus required the guidance of white 
Christians. Importantly, it also provided white Christians 
with a constant source of work yet to be done.  
 Many slaveholders claimed that anyone who had 
spent time around slaves knew that they were an enormous 
burden to their masters. Lack of work ethic from slaves was 
a popular complaint among slaveholders. Not only did this 
perceived laziness offend their idea of the Protestant work 
ethic, but it also caused slaveholders to feel that they were 
investing more in their slaves than they were getting back. 
In his sermon “The Duty of Masters”, Kentucky 
Presbyterian minister Rev. John C. Young describes how 
he believes the Bible is capable of improving the naturally 
inferior characters of slaves. Rev. Young writes,  
 
“The main precept to the servant meets this evil 
by enjoining upon him faithfulness and energy 
in all that he does: ‘Whatever ye do, do it 
heartily.’ And mark the peculiarity of the motive 
by which this precept is enforced, and its 
adaptation to counteract the force of their 
temptation – ‘knowing that of the Lord ye shall 
receive the reward of the inheritance.’ Here is 
what is needed by the servant – a reward held 
out to quicken his sluggish spirit.”19  
 
As he describes later in the quote the “evil” that Young is 
referring to is the sluggish spirit that many slaveholders 
                                                          
18 Chesebrough, ed. “God Ordained This War, 148. 
19 Young, “The Duty of Masters”, 40. 
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reported as prominent amongst their slaves. Young explains 
how the lessons of the Bible can help to improve the 
laziness of slaves. Thus men like Young and Meade firmly 
believed that slavery was the means through which the 
souls of slaves would be saved.  
By creating this picture of slaves as in need of 
ethical reform proslavery Christians gave themselves a 
basis on which to build the rest of their slaveholding ethic. 
They also created a way to undermine the accusations of 
antislavery evangelicals. In order to combat antislavery 
Christian arguments that slaves ought to be freed, 
proslavery Christians pointed to what they saw as the 
degraded lives of freepersons living in the North. In his 
popular work The Religious Instruction of the Negroes in 
the United States, Charles C. Jones, a minister, missionary, 
and slaveholding planter in Liberty County, Georgia, 
discussed what he sees as the debased existence of 
freepersons in the Northern states. Jones wrote,  
 
Their physical condition in the slave states, on 
the whole, is decidedly in advance of what it is 
in the free states. There are more free colored 
families in the slave than in the free states: in the 
latter the young cannot marry, the support of a 
family, especially through the rigors of winter 
being difficult; and consequently numbers of 
youth, abandon themselves to profligacy.20 
 
According to proslavery Christians like Rev. Robert 
Ryland, “the altruism and recklessness of the North on this 
subject” was responsible for the deplorable living 
                                                          
20  Charles C. Jones, The Religious Instruction of the Negroes in the 
United States (GA: Thomas Purse, 1842), 121.  
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conditions of blacks in the free states. 21  They believed that 
the antislavery emphasis on the equality of all persons was 
wholly misguided. Freeing slaves, they believed, would put 
responsibilities on them that they could not handle. This of 
course would eventually lead to freepersons falling into a 
life of vice and moral degeneracy. Therefore antislavery 
Christians, in insisting that slaves should be freed, were in 
fact doing slaves a disservice by facilitating the damnation 
of their souls. Slaves were better off in the care of their 
masters who could see to it that they did not go astray and 
could afford them the opportunity to correct their 
tendencies toward immorality. Rev. Ryland describes the 
effect that he believed religious instruction was having on 
his black congregation at the First African Baptist Church, 
“They have less superstition, less reliance on dreams and 
visions, they talk less of the palpable guidings of the spirit 
as independent of or opposed to the word of God.”22 Thus 
Rev. Ryland draws once again on the proslavery Christian 
depiction of slaves as practitioners of “heathenish” 
superstition. Ryland is claiming that the tendency toward 
superstition is diminishing within his congregation. Yet by 
the very act of invoking a representing of slaves as 
“heathenish”, Ryland is bringing to mind that there are 
other slaves yet to be saved and much more work for 
proslavery Christians to do.   
The notion that slaves were better off under the care 
of a master hinged on the assumption that all masters were 
kind and fatherly toward their slaves, always promoting 
their well-being. The real crux of the slaveholding ethic 
was its demand that slave owners hold themselves to a high 
level of morality and always strive to behave benevolently 
                                                          
21 Ryland, Reminiscences of the First African Church, 292. 
22 Ryland, Reminiscences of the First African Church, 265. 
Wedow 
14 
 
toward their slaves. Slave owners were to give to their 
slaves what was due to them according to God. 23 This gave 
proslavery Christians the ability to argue that slaveholders, 
though they received financial gain from their slaves, were 
actually taking on a Christian burden by being 
slaveholders. Proslavery publications and sermons of the 
period typically started out with the sentiment that slavery 
was an enormous burden on the South, one that she would 
likely be better off without, but that since Southerners were 
now responsible for the slave population it was their 
Christian duty to care for them as well as was possible.24 A 
group of ministers from Columbia, South Carolina 
described well the idea that slaveholders had a 
responsibility to their slaves when they offered a definition 
of slavery in an article in The Southern Presbyterian 
Review. The ministers wrote,  
 
In return for this service, he is to exercise over 
them a just and equal authority, restraining them, 
by appropriate rewards and disciplinary 
inflictions, from idleness, vice, and immorality. 
He is to protect them from wrong and outrage on 
the part of others; to nourish them in helpless 
infancy and feeble old age; to treat them with 
kindness, and to feel towards them the regard to 
which they are entitled as servants of his house 
and the subjects of his family-government.25 
 
                                                          
23 Charles F. Irons, The Origins of Proslavery Christianity: White and 
Black Evangelicals in Colonial and Antebellum Virginia (NC: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2008), 173.  
24 Irons, The Origins of Proslavery Christianity, 178. 
25 “An Association of Ministers” in Columbia, SC, The Southern 
Presbyterian Review Vol. 14 (SC: C.P. Pelham, 1861), 33-34.  
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While antislavery opposition remained strong, the 
church teachings about the duties of masters were quite 
effective in persuading many that slavery, though 
distasteful, did not defy God and was therefore not evil.26 
Frederick Law Olmsted was a famous American landscape 
architect, journalist, and social critic from Connecticut.27 
Olmsted travelled around the Southern United states in 
order to gain a first-hand view of slavery and wrote his 
observation in a work entitled The Cotton Kingdom: A 
Traveler’s Observations on Cotton and Slavery in the 
American Slave States. In this work Olmsted describes the 
demeanor of a Southern planter with whom he was lodging 
toward his slaves. Olmsted writes, “In his own case, at 
least, I did not doubt; his manner toward them was paternal 
– familiar and kind; and they came to him like children 
who have been given some task, and constantly are wanting 
to be encouraged and guided, simply and confidently.”28 
Proslavery representations of slaves as child-like contented 
beings living under the care of a kind father figure were 
effective in combating antislavery representations of slaves 
as brutalized, dejected creatures living under the harsh 
dictatorship of a Simon Legree.  
The years leading up to and during the Civil War 
saw a great deal of concern among proslavery Christians 
that slaves receive religious instruction.29 Evangelizing 
                                                          
26 Mark Noll, America’s God (Ney York: Oxford University Press, 
2002), 388.  
27 Frederick Law Olmsted, The Cotton Kingdom: A Traveler’s 
Observations on Cotton and Slavery in the American Slave States (NY: 
Mason Brothers, 1861), 1.  
28 Frederick Law Olmsted. The Cotton Kingdom, 54. 
29 John B. Boles, Masters and Slaves in the House of the Lord: Race 
and Religion in the American South 1740-1870 (KY: University of 
Kentucky Press, 1988), 109. 
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slaves and instructing them in the teachings of God was one 
way to give legitimacy to the entire institution of slavery 
which was under heavy attack by abolitionists. Proslavery 
ministers, many of them slaveholders themselves, 
thundered from the pulpit that though slavery was not evil 
or fundamentally wrong, there was one significant problem 
with the system: every single proslavery Christian could be 
doing more to foster the religious education of slaves.  
 Though the mission to the slaves was encouraged 
by virtually all proslavery Christians, it was perhaps 
implemented most zealously in Liberty County, Georgia. 
Charles C. Jones, a Presbyterian minister and planter in 
Liberty County became the leader of the missionary effort 
there.  Jones was born to a wealthy planter in Liberty 
County and spent some time in the North while attending 
Andover seminary in Massachusetts.30  While at Andover, 
Jones experienced some serious doubts about the 
righteousness of slavery. Jones was bothered by a system 
which held human beings in bondage. He wrote to his 
fiancée of his confusion, 
 
I am moreover undecided whether I ought to 
hold slaves. As to the principle of slavery, it is 
wrong! It is unjust and contrary to nature and 
religion to hold men enslaved. But the question 
is, in my present circumstances, with the evil of 
my hands entailed from my father, would the 
general interest of the slaves and community at 
large, with reference to the slaves themselves, be 
promoted best, by emancipation? Could I do 
more for the ultimate good of the slave 
                                                          
30 Erskine Clarke, Wrestlin’ Jacob: A Portrait of Religion in the Old 
South (GA: John Knox Press, 1979), 10-11. 
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population by holding or emancipating what I 
own? 31 
 
Despite his reservations about slavery, after 
graduating from Andover Jones returned to Liberty County 
and became a slaveholding planter like his father. Jones 
was always unsure about slavery, and so in an attempt to 
both distinguish himself from abolitionists and still take 
action that he believed would improve the lives of slaves, 
he threw himself into missionary work among the slave 
population.32  Jones was responsible for founding the 
“Liberty County Association for the Religious Instruction 
of the Negroes” and for persuading other planters and 
ministers from Liberty County to join.33 
 Jones was surely not the only proslavery 
evangelical to hold reservations about the institution of 
slavery, but his case does offer an alternative view of the 
slaveholding ethic. Other proslavery evangelicals like 
Virginia’s Thornton Stringfellow viewed slavery as an evil 
in the South which had to be mitigated through a 
missionary effort.34 The institution of slavery was a deeply 
engrained part of Southern culture, one that allowed the 
Southern aristocracy to maintain their life of leisure and 
wealth. Men like Jones and Stringfellow had been 
indoctrinated into the institution of slavery since their 
births, but nonetheless held a distaste for the institution.35 
                                                          
31 “Charles Jones to Mary Jones” (1830, JCTU), Erskine Clarke. 
Wrestlin’ Jacob: A Portrait of Religion in the Old  South (GA: John 
Knox Press, 1979), 14. 
32 Erskine Clarke. Wrestlin’ Jacob, 15. 
33 Erskine Clarke. Wrestlin’ Jacob, 28. 
34 Irons, The Origins of Prosalvery Christianity, 215. Stringfellow was 
a Baptist minister in Virginia who wrote and preached in favor of 
preserving slavery in spite of his distaste for the institution.  
35 Charles F. Irons, The Origins of Proslavery Christianity, 217. 
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Many ministers, whether as admissions of personal opinion 
or as rhetorical strategy, admitted that slavery was an evil. 
Thus slavery existed in an oddly contradictory position: it 
was an evil, but one that proslavery Christians nonetheless 
fought fiercely to defend.  
 In his book The Religious Instruction of the Negroes 
in the United States Jones set out to explore the religious 
and moral condition of slaves. He claimed that the vast 
majority of slaves live in a state of moral ignorance and 
degradation and were therefore in desperate need of 
corrective teaching from ministers and missionaries.36  He 
stressed the importance of the mission to the slaves by 
putting forth a representation of them as a class of helpless 
persons. Jones insisted, “It is not too much, therefore to say 
that the Negroes are in a state of almost absolute 
dependence on their owners for the words of eternal life. 
They are the most needy of any people in our country.” 37 
The idea that slaves needed white Christians in order to 
acquire salvation was at the very heart of the slaveholding 
ethic.  
 Even if proslavery Christians could prove that 
slavery was being used to accomplish righteous work, they 
still had a big problem to get around. Specifically, the 
concept that white mediation was necessary for black 
salvation contradicted the evangelical belief that salvation 
is given freely to anyone who asks for it. Evangelicals 
celebrated the liberating nature of their religion because it 
moved away from the need for any sort of intercessor in 
order to gain forgiveness and salvation. Yet in the 
slaveholding ethic that they created they set themselves up 
as necessary intercessors for their slaves. Without the built-
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in need for white involvement the entire slaveholding ethic 
would have come tumbling down. Because proslavery 
Christians believed that slaves were more like children than 
adults, they created a role for themselves as necessary 
guardians and caregivers.  
At the heart of the slaveholding ethic was a belief 
that people of color were fundamentally different from 
white people in a way that rendered them closer to children 
than adults. George W. Freeman, a minister in North 
Carolina expressed in one of two discourses entitled “The 
Rights and Duties of Slaveholders” the belief that slaves 
could be thought of as perpetual children. In discussing 
slaveholders’ duties to care for the immortal souls of their 
slaves Freeman wrote, 
Our children, we all feel and acknowledge, have 
decided claims of this sort upon us. And in what 
respect, brethren, does the relation which we 
bear in this matter to our children, differ from 
that in which we stand to our slaves? They are 
both providentially placed under our protection. 
They are equally dependent upon us – especially 
subject to our authority – and they alike stand in 
need of our help and guidance in the all-
important concern of working out their 
salvation. 38  
 
This comparison between children and slaves was 
extremely popular and well-versed for explaining why 
slavery was beneficial to slaves.  
Yet as Freeman goes on to discuss, slaveholders did 
recognize some differences between their slaves and their 
children. Children eventually grow up, become independent 
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adults, and leave home. Yet for slaves, “their state of 
pupilage never ceases; they are always with us; they are 
always members of our families; they are always subject to 
our authority and control.”39 Slaves were to be handled as 
children with love and compassion, but it was also 
necessary to recognize that they were different from white 
children. While the slaveholding ethic insisted on the 
importance of maintaining the physical comfort of slaves 
by providing adequate food, shelter, and clothing, the 
linchpin that held the entire argument together was the 
accountability of slaveholders for the religious instruction 
and education of their slaves. It was the mission to the 
slaves that proslavery Christians believed gave 
slaveholding its true value and justifiability.  
It was widely claimed that slaves were slow learners 
and could only handle simple material.  Ministers and 
teachers, much like slaveholders, were to exercise patience 
and restraint when working with slaves. In his collection of 
sermons intended for slaves, Presbyterian minister Rev. 
A.F. Dickson offered specific instructions to teachers for 
how lessons should be conducted. Dickson wrote, 
 
They are sensitive to cold, to constrained 
attitudes, and to distracting influences of every 
kind; On the other hand, the subjects to be dwelt 
upon are more or less abstract, and therefore 
arduous to their awkward minds; and your 
language, simple and familiar as it seems to you, 
is yet somewhat removed from their colloquial 
dialect, and so far forth foreign to them. Then 
you need to make the whole business as inviting 
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to them as possible. A sullen, discontented 
listener is already lost to any hope of benefit.40 
 
Passages like this one from Rev. Dickson illustrate 
how deeply white Christians believed they were needed by 
their slaves. This idea was essential both to combating 
antislavery arguments that slaves ought to be emancipated 
as well as to the proslavery understanding of themselves as 
performing merciful work.  
But this system of special instruction did not come 
with expectations solely for teachers and ministers. Slaves 
were expected to take the lessons to heart and to implement 
them in order to become better, more obedient servants. 
This is apparent in the incredible number of sermons 
preached by proslavery ministers to black congregations 
that emphasized the importance and virtue of obedience. 
One such minister, Alexander Glennie, a native of 
Scotland, originally came to the United States in order to 
tutor a wealthy planter’s son. Though Glennie himself was 
a minister in the Protestant Episcopal Church, his books of 
plantation sermons were used widely by evangelicals in 
their efforts to teach slaves about Christianity. In sermon 
four of his Sermons Preached on Plantations to 
Congregations of Negroes, Glennie gave a well-worn 
lesson about the duty of slaves to be obedient. The passage 
offered as justification was a favorite among proslavery 
Christians, “Servants, be obedient to them that are your 
masters according to the flesh, with fear and trembling, in 
singleness of your heart, as unto Christ.”41   Slaves became 
extremely familiar with this verse, as nearly all sermons 
preached to them by white ministers had something to do 
                                                          
40 Rev. A.F. Dickson, Lessons About Salvation (PA: Presbyterian Board 
of Publication, 1860), 6. 
41 The New American Bible. Ephesians 6:5. 
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with the theme of obedience.  Glennie went on to say in 
this sermon, 
 
You are here directed to be obedient to your 
master ‘with fear and trembling.’ That is, you 
ought to feel so anxious to discharge your duty 
faithfully, as to feel afraid of giving offence by 
any conduct that looks like disobedience; for, by 
disobedience, you not only offend your earthly 
master, but you sin against God, and of this 
every Christian servant will be afraid. A bad 
servant will be afraid only of the punishment he 
will receive, if his disobedience should be found 
out. But a Christian servant must look up always 
to his heavenly master.42 
 
This passage, and the frequency with which 
Ephesians 6:5 was used in sermons preached to black 
congregations, is telling of the motives of proslavery 
Christians. The focus of slave instruction became molding 
slaves into better workers. It is easy to see the selfish 
motivation in this, yet nonetheless proslavery Christians 
insisted that by making slaves into better workers they were 
helping them fulfill God’s purpose for their lives. 
Advocates of missionary work to slaves mostly 
maintained an attitude of extreme optimism toward the 
progress of the cause. One such organization that displayed 
this attitude was Charles Jones’ Association for the 
Religious Instruction of the Negroes in Liberty County, 
Georgia. The Association published yearly reports about 
their activities and progress for the year and always had 
good news to report. The Association said of the religious 
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meetings that they encouraged masters to hold for their 
slaves “A kind providence has specially smiled upon these 
meetings.”43 The report goes on to provide a section in 
which slaveholders in Liberty County wrote in and 
responded to a series of questions about the religious 
instruction of slaves. Slaveholders were asked if they had 
any objection whatsoever to the religious instruction of 
slaves, to which every responder replied no.44 They were 
also asked if they had any suggestions for improvement to 
which everyone replied that they either had no suggestions 
or only suggested that more teachers and missionaries be 
provided.45 Lastly, slaveholders were asked if they had 
noticed any change in their slaves, to which every 
responder replied that their slaves had become more 
obedient, more trustworthy, and all around better 
servants.46 This document demonstrates how careful and 
guarded proslavery Christians were in their justifications of 
slavery. Organizations like the Association were under a 
great deal of pressure to demonstrate success, therefore 
they made sure that the picture looked good.  
 In the years leading up to and during the American 
Civil War, evangelical proslavery Christians were aware 
that they were under heavy attack from antislavery 
Christians. In response proslavery Christians crafted a 
deeply paternalistic ethic in which slaveholding was not 
only acceptable, but righteous. In a country as steeped in 
evangelical Christianity as the United States, the upper 
hand would go to whomever could adequately prove that 
their cause was supported by the Bible and therefore by 
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44 8th Annual Report, 33. 
45 8th Annual Report, 33. 
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God. The trouble was that both sides were able to provide 
evidence that the Bible supported their cause. Therefore 
even though most proslavery Christians genuinely believed 
in their paternalistic defense of slavery, that paternalism 
was always strained because the Bible, the ultimate source 
of guidance, could not definitively say one way or another 
whether slavery was acceptable. This strain perhaps arose 
from the fact that the paternalistic slaveholding ethic, 
though proslavery Christians tried desperately to prove 
otherwise, contradicted the evangelical belief in free 
salvation for every person. Yes, salvation was still available 
to slaves, but according to proslavery Christians, the moral 
condition of slaves was so degraded that they would never 
attain salvation without white mediation. All of this 
depended on carefully crafted representations of slaves as 
ignorant, incapable, and dependent. Thus it becomes 
readily apparent that slaveholding religion, though it 
professed to be for the betterment of slaves, was truly for 
the benefit of slaveholders. This strain weighed heavily on 
men such as Charles Jones and Thornton Stringfellow and 
undoubtedly on countless others. In the rhetoric of 
proslavery ministers slaves existed in a perpetual childhood 
that needed to be directed toward salvation by white 
Christians. The fighting on the battlefield was thus being 
fueled by another brutal fight taking place in pulpits across 
the nation.   
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Men and Machines: The Psychological Impact of 
Gunboats on the Fort Henry and Donelson Campaign 
 
S. Marianne Johnson 
 
In an age of steam and industry, the ironclad 
warship represents the pinnacle of the Industrial 
Revolution. Although ironclads had been in existence in 
France and Britain in the 1850s, the American Civil War 
demonstrated the first time these gunboats were put to use 
in ship to ship warfare en masse.1 Today, ironclads are seen 
as one of the great technological achievements of the Civil 
War, but their conception and birth were surrounded by 
doubts and fears. Despite their intrigue, there has not been 
an in-depth study of the psychological effects of these 
revolutionary weapons on the men serving in and those 
opposing them. The closest study is Gary Joiner’s chapter 
on the timberclads Lexington and Tyler at the Battle of 
Shiloh.2 The bulk of the primary source material has come 
from the Official Records of the Union and Confederate 
Navies and the Official Records of the Union and 
Confederate Armies. Tracing the planning, building, and 
deployment of the first gunboats in the Western Gunboat 
Flotilla from late 1861 through the Forts Henry and 
Donelson campaign in February of 1862 explains how the 
ironclads came to be remembered as a symbol of Yankee 
power and invincibility.  
                                                          
1 Ervan G. Garrison, “Three Ironclad Warships—The Archaeology of 
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 When Union General Winfield Scott introduced the 
Anaconda Plan, a design to isolate the Confederacy and 
squeeze it into submission, a crucial part of the plan was to 
control the Mississippi River and cut the Confederacy in 
half.3 To do so, the Department of the Navy began to 
consider the possibility of ironclad gunboats to conquer and 
control the river. The Department sent orders to Captain 
John Rodgers on May 16, 1861, sending him to General 
George McClellan’s Headquarters at Cincinnati “in regard 
to the expediency of establishing a Naval Armament on the 
Mississippi and Ohio rivers, or either of them, with a view 
of blockading or interdicting communication and 
interchanges with the states that are in insurrections.”4 The 
orders went on to state that this operation would be under 
the supervision of the Army and that Rodgers would be 
subordinate to McClellan.5 After communicating with 
McClellan, Rodgers bought three steamships to be 
converted into timberclads, the Conestoga, Lexington, and 
A. O. Taylor.6 Rodgers changed the name Taylor to Tyler 
due his personal aversion to President Zachary Taylor, 
viewed at the time as a part of the ‘Slave Power 
Conspiracy’ for his involvement in the Mexican Cession.7 
Rodgers purchased the ships for the “aggregate”8 price of 
                                                          
3 Gary Joiner, Mr. Lincoln’s Brownwater Navy: The Mississippi 
Squadron (New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2007), 
9. 
4 Orders from Department of the Navy to Captain John Rodgers, May 
16, 1861. Rodgers Family Papers, Library of Congress. 
5 Orders of Dept. of Navy, Rodgers Family Papers. 
6 A timberclad was similar in structure to an ironclad, but as its name 
suggests, was armored with thick planks of timber instead of iron 
plating. 
7 Report, June 8, 1861, Rodgers Family Papers. 
8 Report, June 8, 1861, Rodgers Family Papers. 
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$62,000 and predicted that at least another $41,000 would 
be necessary to strengthen and outfit them for battle. 
 In addition to timberclads, a contract for ironclad 
gunboats, later to be known as city-class ironclads, was 
announced.9 In the summer of 1861, advertisements began 
to appear in newspapers across the North encouraging 
shipbuilders to submit their proposals for ironclads. The 
Boston Daily Advertiser announced on June 3, 1861 that 
shipbuilders should submit their proposals to the Navy 
Bureau of Construction by June 15.10 On July 27, The 
Daily Picayune in New Orleans reported that plans had 
been accepted and the gunboats would be built at 
Cincinnati.11 John Lenthall was the first to try to design the 
boats, but abandoned the project because of doubts. After 
withdrawing from the project, the task fell to his 
subordinate, Samuel Pook.12  
 In order to minimize vulnerability, Pook moved the 
single paddle wheel into the middle of the ship, inside the 
carapace. This provided decent protection at the expense of 
maneuverability; turning would be difficult. James 
Buchannan Eads won the contract to build seven ironclads 
using a layout similar to that of the timberclads based on 
Pook’s designs at $89,600 per ship, nearly four times what 
Lenthall had originally quoted. 13 In December of 1861, the 
                                                          
9 Joiner, Brownwater Navy, 25. 
10 “The New Gunboats,” Boston Daily Advertiser (Boston, MA) 
Monday, June 3, 1861; Issue 131; col. D. 
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12 John D. Milligan, ”From Theory to Application: The Emergence of 
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1984), 126. 
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Department of the Navy asked Congress for twelve million 
dollars for the ironclad program, more than the Navy’s 
entire budget for 1860.14 The Western Flotilla began its 
journey as a project with dubious success producing 
immense cost for its day.  
Despite disputes between the Army and Navy for 
who would pay these immense costs, preparations 
continued.15 The gunboats were to be one hundred and 
seventy-five feet long and fifty-five feet wide.16 They 
would have a draft of no more than four feet and the 
ironclads would be plated with sheets of iron two and a half 
inches thick and twelve to twenty-one inches wide joined 
with interlocking grooves.17 The whole project was 
expected to be completed in six to eight weeks. However, 
constructing the timber and iron warriors would be harder 
than first imagined. These gunboats were on the cutting 
edge of naval warfare, and new technologies meant trial 
and error. The boats were originally contracted to have two 
large staterooms for senior officers, ten smaller staterooms 
for junior officers, and two eight by ten foot mess decks for 
the enlisted men. As work got under way, however, the 
contractors quickly realized there simply was not enough 
room on the boats to fit everything. Instead of twelve total 
staterooms, the Conestoga could only be outfitted with 
eight rooms, each six foot square.18  Problems continued 
when it came time to arm the boats. Contractors found 
load-bearing beams where guns were supposed to go and 
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had to find ways of working all the guns in without 
compromising the structure.19 Lt. Seth L. Phelps, who 
would eventually command one of the gunships, was 
seriously concerned about the work being done; he reported 
the joiner work was sloppy and expressed doubts about 
their success.20  
 Recruiting had been going on since the end of June, 
but Rodgers found considerable difficulty in getting men to 
enlist. This new project was uncertain from the start; no 
one knew yet how effective these boats would be in 
repelling enemy fire. Rodgers acknowledged that “the 
boilers and engines cannot be defended against cannon 
shot. We must take our chances.”21 No one knew exactly 
what would happen if a boiler was hit, and perhaps this 
danger kept men from enlisting.22 As the months went on, 
Rodgers desperately requested that Gideon Wells send him 
men, but none were to be had. Rodgers was forced to make 
do out in the west.23 The result was that the Western 
Gunboat Flotilla was crewed by a peculiar conglomeration 
of men who did not fit in anywhere else. Army transfers (or 
those who did not perform well in the infantry), rough 
riverboat pilots, and eventually former slaves and 
contrabands crewed the Mississippi gunboats.24 The crews 
were brash and undisciplined, brawling in the streets, some 
even dying of alcohol poisoning before shipping out.25 Lt. 
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Phelps again expressed his concern, telling Rodgers that he 
was displeased with the quality of the pilots. 26 
 Uncertainties also arose over the time it took to 
complete the ironclads. The date by which the ironclads 
were to be completed came and went, and although 
unprecedented funds had been spent, it seemed there was 
never enough money or time to finally complete them. As 
Rodgers grew more and more impatient with the situation 
in the Cairo, St. Louis, and Mound City shipyards, Eads 
continued to assure him that it was only a matter of time 
until the ironclads were in the rivers. Finally, on November 
19, 1861, Eads declared the ironclads ready for service. The 
names of the six were Mound City, St. Louis, Pittsburg, 
Cincinnati, Benton, and Carondelet.27 In addition to these 
six, another vessel, the New Era, was converted to an 
ironclad and renamed the Essex.28 
 Once completed, the ironclads were anything but 
sleek and glamorous weapons of war. Squat and peculiar 
looking, they quickly gained the nickname “Pook’s 
Turtles”29 for their resemblance to the animal. Cramped, 
noisy, and dirty are words that suited the ironclads well. 
The only way to get to the pilot house was through two 
round ladders and very small port holes that only “active 
men”30 could fit through. The steam-powered engines 
worked around the clock causing constant rattling and 
noise. The vessels burned up to six thousand pounds of coal 
per day and belched black smoke, covering the vessels with 
a thick layer of black grime.31 Inside the ironclads, average 
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temperatures hovered around ninety degrees but would 
swell above one hundred on hot days, earning them another 
nickname, the “federal bake ovens.”32 
 The Western Gunboat Flotilla was born amidst a 
storm of doubt and obstacle. In August and September of 
1861, however, the storm began to abate. The completed 
timberclads arrived in Cairo, Illinois on August 16 and 
immediately were ordered to “make a demonstration down 
the River towards New Madrid.”33 As the boats began to 
operate, newspapers across the North began to sing the 
praises of the new gun boats. The North American & 
United States Gazette reported on September 26 that the 
gunboats were “floating and formidable shape…impervious 
to point blank shots—a ball striking them horizontally will 
glance off like a hailstone from a steep roof.”34 Two days 
later, the Daily National Intelligencer claimed that a test 
shot fired at one hundred yards did no damage to the iron 
and that instead, the ball itself broke in pieces.35 It is 
doubtful that a solid shot actually did break into pieces, but 
these reports had considerable psychological effects on 
soldiers and civilians alike. 
 Newspapers convinced Northern citizens they had 
an impenetrable weapon. They promised that “If the new 
gunboats now building near St. Louis, prove to be as 
invulnerable as expected, they will be one of the most 
effective…in whipping the rebellion. She can’t be sunk, 
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burned, nor blown up.”36 The reporter was referring the 
New Era, later renamed the Essex. W.B. Coleman, acting 
Paymaster of the Tyler, wrote in late September, “It is 
astonishing what a change…has brought about in Public 
Opinion in regard to these Gun Boats, they are positively 
quoted now as the safety guards…”37 These praises only 
got louder as the boats continued to perform. On November 
7, 1861, General Ulysses Grant decided to try to take 
Belmont, just across the river from the Confederate 
stronghold at Columbus, Kentucky. Belmont proved too 
strong, however, and he was forced to withdraw. During 
the retreat, the Lexington and Tyler were able to put up a 
strong enough cover fire to allow all of Grant’s forces to 
evacuate. Both Grant and the naval captains recognized that 
the gunboats had served a valuable purpose; had it not been 
for the well-directed cover fire, Grant’s men probably 
would not have been able to pull out successfully.38 
Belmont impacted Grant profoundly; there he learned the 
importance of joint army-navy maneuvers that would 
characterize the rest of his fighting in the west.39  
 Reports from the gunboat captains took on a more 
hopeful tone after Belmont and even more so throughout 
December and January of 1861-62. Earlier that fall, 
Rodgers was replaced by Flag Officer Andrew Hull Foote 
for disagreeing with Major General John C. Fremont, but 
he left behind the beginnings of a fleet “worth more than 
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5,000 soldiers.”40 The western crewmen were performing 
well and proving that they could make good artillerymen 
after all. Many were impressed by the boats’ ability to 
withstand heavy fire. Phelps’ report after the Battle of 
Lucas Bend was incredibly positive, reporting inflicting 
damage and receiving little in return.41  
 As the new gunboats commenced patrolling the 
rivers, Confederate horrors were only beginning. The rivers 
in the south cut straight to the core of the Confederacy, and 
the shallow gunboats were able to penetrate deeply into 
enemy territory with relative ease. This caused devastating 
psychological effects on Confederate citizens and soldiers 
alike. Appearing without warning, the gunboats represented 
a piercing type of invasion. Unlike the land armies, 
gunboats were incredibly mobile, seeming to materialize 
out of thin air and cause absolute terror in Confederate 
sympathizers. Images of vile Yankee gunboats preying on 
towns of old men and women supported the myth of the 
Vandal Yankee and infuriated Southern soldiers who could 
not effectively defend against them.42 The North American 
& United States Gazette reproduced a section of the 
Richmond Examiner on September 2 expressing relief that 
the South had finally started work on their own gunboats to 
combat Yankees “prowling through our rivers and hovering 
about our harbors.”43 Commander Strembel of the 
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Cincinnati claimed that two shots from the ironclad sent 
Confederate troops fleeing eight miles from the river.44 
 The Mississippi Gunboat Flotilla entered the Fort 
Henry and Donelson campaign as a weapon of terror. 
Although they had not yet fought a significant battle, both 
sides believed the ironclads to be impenetrable and 
undefeatable. For the North, this caused joy and 
confidence; for the South, fear and helplessness reigned. By 
early 1862, Grant had decided to attempt joint maneuvers 
to push up the Tennessee River and attained permission 
from Major General Henry Halleck to do so on February 1, 
1862. Halleck, unsure of the success of such a mission, 
carefully crafted his orders so that if the mission should 
fail, all of the blame would fall on Grant.45  
 Nevertheless, Grant moved forward with his plans. 
Fort Henry sat low on the Tennessee River in a poorly 
chosen spot. It did not help matters any that in his frenzied 
attempt to turn Columbus into the ‘Gibraltar’ of the West, 
Major General Leonidas Polk had diverted resources for the 
fort’s defense to Columbus. The result was an unfinished 
and sloppily built fort that could be enfiladed by three or 
four points on the opposite shore.46 Manned by 2,610 men, 
only a third of which were disciplined and properly trained, 
the fort was in bad shape by early 1862.47 Most of the men 
were armed with shotguns and hunting rifles, and one of 
the better armed regiments, the 10th Tennessee, was using 
“Tower of London” flintlock muskets that had last seen 
action in the War of 1812.48 As early as February 4, 
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soldiers inside the fort could see “as far as the eye could 
see, the course of the river could be traced by the dense 
volumes of smoke issuing from the flotilla.”49 The soldiers 
in the fort knew attack was imminent.  
 In early February, 1862, Grant issued Field Orders 
No. 1 outlining the plan for the attack.  The first division 
under Major General John McClernand was to occupy the 
road between Fort Henry and Fort Donelson, twelve miles 
away on the Cumberland River, to cut off the escape route 
and prevent reinforcements to Fort Henry. Meanwhile, two 
brigades under Major General C. F. Smith were to move up 
the west bank of the Tennessee while the Third Brigade, 
Second Division advanced up the east bank. One company 
of the Second Division was detailed to Flag Officer Foote 
to serve as sharpshooters on the gunboats, who would 
approach the fort straight on and engage.50 
 At 10:20pm on February 6, the ironclads 
Cincinnati, Carondelet, St. Louis, and Essex approached 
Fort Henry four abreast. Behind them, the three timberclad 
gunboats formed a second line. Fire opened at 1,700 yards 
and steadily advanced to within 600 yards. 51 Within the 
fort, Confederate General Lloyd Tilghman knew his force 
could not drive back the gunboats and made the choice to 
send most of his force to Fort Donelson, a much more 
defendable position. Tilghman retained only the heavy 
artillery to perform delay tactics until the bulk of his force 
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could reach Donelson. In his after-action report, Tilghman 
estimated that the enemy gunboats had about fifty-four 
guns as opposed to the eleven in the fort.52 Tilghman 
managed to hold on until approximately 2:00 p.m.53  
 Tilghman’s report rings with language of 
desperation and hopelessness. After sending the bulk of his 
force to Donelson, Tilghman was faced with the choice of 
leaving his men or staying with them. Ultimately, he 
recognized what a psychological blow it would be to his 
men to abandon them. He decided to fight and stay, 
although his language makes clear that he had no hope of 
successfully fending off the ironclads. First, his twenty-four 
pounder gun exploded, killing or disabling every man at the 
piece. Next, the vent of his ten-inch Columbiad clogged 
and refused to reopen. One by one, he recorded the loss of 
each gun with growing anxiety. After firing for close to 
three hours, his men were exhausted. General Tilghman 
himself stepped in for an exhausted gunner at one of the 
thirty-two pounders.54 
  Reading Tilghman’s report leaves the one with the 
impression even the best gunmen the Confederacy could 
not oppose Yankee technology. Even if this is not accurate, 
the report is still a fascinating example of the Confederate 
dread of ironclads. One observer commented on the 
devastating effect the ironclads had on Confederate 
soldiers’ morale: “Our artillerists became very much 
discouraged when they saw the two heavy guns disabled, 
the enemy’s boats apparently uninjured and still drawing 
nearer and nearer. Some of them even ceased to work the 
32-pounder guns, under the belief that such shot were too 
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light to produce any effect upon the ironclad sides of the 
enemy’s boats.”55 After the fort had surrendered, a captured 
Confederate gunner told a Federal sailor the Carondelet 
was the object of hatred and frustration among the gunners 
who, despite their well-aimed fire, could not disable her.56 
These incidents give the reader an image nearing futility; 
despite well-aimed Confederate fire, the ironclads just kept 
coming. Confederate accounts reveal the classic man versus 
machine dichotomy and give insight into the deeper 
psychological issues surrounding ironclads.  
 All told, the ironclads survived their baptism of fire 
quite well. The Carondelet and the St. Louis took six and 
seven hits respectively but reported no casualties. The 
Cincinnati took thirty one hits but reported only one killed 
and nine wounded. The Essex took fifteen hits, the last one 
piercing the boiler.57 In addition to the Confederate 
soldiers, the psychological impact of the gunboats on the 
Federal sailors who served in them cannot be overlooked. 
Believing the newspapers, many gunboatmen went into 
battle with a false sense of safety because they believed 
their gunboats were impenetrable.58 However, they were 
quickly disabused of these notions. Before an engagement, 
buckets of water and sand would be brought up to the deck. 
The water was for men to drink during combat; the sand 
was to absorb the blood. Seeing the sand forced men to 
confront their fears and the possibility of their injuries or 
deaths.59 The combination of smoke from the engines and 
guns resulted in smoke so dark and thick that sometimes a 
man could not see the man working the gun next to him. 
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The darkness and almost suffocating effect of the smoke 
was disorienting and made men vulnerable to panic and the 
heat was so intense often men would strip to the waist and 
sweat so profusely they related it to rain.60  
 Unlike a land battlefield, inside an ironclad, there 
was nowhere to go to escape the carnage short of jumping 
into the river. The plating on the gunboats negated the 
impact of musket fire; instead, men saw the impact of large 
guns, ripping holes and sending splinters of wood and other 
debris into the crew and inflicting horrifying, gaping 
wounds. Men fought amidst the blood, limbs, and all other 
horrors that covered the decks.61 For Federal gunboatmen, 
combat became a waiting game. Some men found 
themselves counting the number of times shots hit certain 
areas of the boat, waiting for one to penetrate.62  Although 
safe for a moment, at any time a shot could hit just the right 
spot and turn the boat into a floating death trap. 
 The Essex exemplifies how one well-placed shot 
could turn a gunboat into a nightmare. The officers and 
designers knew the gunboats were weak around the boilers 
and engines, but there was little that could be done.63 The 
worst sound that could be heard on a gunboat in the 
Mississippi River was the sound of a shot hitting the boiler, 
a sharp crack followed by an intense rushing sound as 
scalding hot steam exploded in every direction. Steam from 
a boiler seared and boiled flesh and could even knock out 
teeth.64 When the shot entered the Essex, it decapitated 
Acting Master’s Mate S. B. Brittan before striking the 
boiler. Both pilots were immediately scalded to death and 
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almost thirty men were soon after “writhing in agony”65 on 
the deck. Only about half of the wounded would recover.66 
Captain Porter dove through a gun port to escape the steam 
and was caught by Seaman John Walker, who held onto 
him with one arm and the boat with the other until help 
arrived.67 The men on the Essex saw comrades literally 
boiled to death and from inside the fort Confederate 
Captain Jesse Taylor could see men throwing themselves 
“wildly” into the water to escape the steam.68 
 After the fort fell, the timberclads Lexington and 
Conestoga were sent upriver to pursue any Confederate 
vessels they came across. They overcame eight Confederate 
vessels whose crews were forced to set them on fire before 
they could be captured by Union sailors. Included in the 
destruction was a load of iron destined for the Tredgar Iron 
Works and the destruction of over $100,000 of Confederate 
government property. At Florence and Tuscumbia, Federal 
troops broke into Confederate government warehouses and 
helped themselves to provisions but left civilian property 
alone.69 Southern sympathizers reacted to the loss in horror. 
The new Federal gunboats seemed invincible. The fight 
was relayed by the Daily Columbus Enquirer as an almost 
completely one-sided affair. “The fall of the first-named 
fort[Henry], we have no doubt, is due to the superiority of 
the guns of the Yankees—their gunboats, we presume, 
standing off, as at Hatteras, beyond the effective range of 
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the guns of the fort, and at this safe distance pouring into it 
a fire which ultimately compelled its surrender or 
evacuation.”70 John Beauchamp Jones, a Confederate clerk, 
spun the invasion upriver as an attack on helpless, 
despairing women. As the boats continued their upriver 
raid, Confederates became terrified that the gunboats would 
be able to get into Alabama and Mississippi.71  
 For others, however, the gunboats had an interesting 
way of sorting out sympathies. Captain Phelps reported 
Unionists suddenly appearing on the river banks, telling 
stories of forced conscription, appealing to the gunboats as 
their liberators and begging them to stay. Often, the sight of 
gunboats would embolden Unionist citizens to unmask 
their sympathies, tearing apart the notion of the solid South. 
Phelps also reported that at least twenty-five young men 
clambered to the ironclads to enlist in the Union Army.72 
Once the gunboats departed, however, many of those same 
citizens hid those convictions because the gunboats were no 
longer there to protect them.73 The morale boost in the 
North was astounding. Flag Officer Foote was praised for 
his action and when the Cincinnati steamed into Cairo with 
Fort Henry’s Stars and Bars flying upside down under the 
United States flag, the city erupted into joyous cheering.74 
Some declared that the war would soon be over, but Flag 
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Officer Foote mourned the losses on the Essex and vowed 
that “never again will I go into a fight half-prepared.”75 
 The victory at Fort Henry was much more important 
for its psychological effect than for its actual military 
achievements. Although at first glance it appears that the 
ironclads were able to pull off a stunning, single-handed 
victory, two key factors worked hugely to their advantage. 
First, the horrible positioning of the fort beneath the water 
line resulted in flooding and allowed the ironclads to pour 
direct fire into it. Secondly, the bulk force of the garrison 
had already been sent ahead to Fort Donelson and only a 
skeleton force remained behind to cover the retreat. These 
factors produced a skewed vision of the ironclads as 
invincible weapons of war.76 The Macon Daily Telegraph 
glumly reported on the hard losses of the fort and the 
timberclad raid, misreporting that there was only one 
Federal casualty from the battle.77 
 The same newspaper, however, sought to minimize 
fear of the ironclads. One week after reporting on the hard 
losses, the Macon Daily Telegraph ran an article titled 
“Federal Gunboats Not Invulnerable.” The article 
misreported that the Confederates had been able to inflict 
one hundred Federal casualties and assured its readers that 
at least two shots had been able to penetrate the iron on the 
Essex and the Cincinnati. The article went on to predict that 
if the ironclads were to attack a better equipped, stronger 
fort, the outcome would be different.78 The article ran on 
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February 19, two days after Fort Donelson fell, but 
Donelson is never mentioned in the article and the 
prediction seems almost prophetic. 
 Meanwhile, preparations were being made inside 
Fort Donelson for the coming attack. Reporting on the state 
of Donelson’s defenses, Chief Engineer Lt. Colonel Gilmer 
felt confident in the fort’s ability to withstand a land attack 
but remained concerned about the gunboats.79 Brigadier 
General John Floyd, the commander officer of the fort, 
echoed similar sentiments. Floyd betrayed his anxiety, 
saying, “If the best information I can gather about these 
iron-clad boats be true they are nearly invulnerable, and 
therefore they can probably go wherever sufficient fuel and 
depth of water can be found, unless met by opposing 
gunboats.”80 Instead of waiting for orders, Grant 
capitalized on the opportunity and started immediately for 
Fort Donelson. Because the ironclads had performed so 
well at Fort Henry, Grant allowed them to attack without 
infantry support.81 This would prove to be a mistake. 
Donelson was much better outfitted, manned by about 
thirteen thousand troops, and sat on one hundred and 
twenty foot bluffs, starkly different from the lowlands of 
Fort Henry.82 On February 14, the ironclad assault was to 
begin in earnest. This was not the same fleet that had taken 
on Fort Henry; both the Essex and the Cincinnati were out 
for repairs. This time, the Louisville and the Pittsburg 
would join the Carondelet and the St. Louis along with the 
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timberclads Tyler and Conestoga.83 Foote himself was still 
not confident after the Essex boiler explosion and did not 
feel the Flotilla was ready to go into action again. Grant, 
however, disagreed, confident in their ability to deliver him 
another quick victory.84 The night before the assault, the 
two men met to discuss their disagreement. Although much 
of the conversation has been lost, Grant emerged cheerful 
and sure of his impending victory.85   
 On the morning of the assault, Grant and his staff 
assembled to watch the spectacular ironclads at work. 
Freezing rain and snow had reduced visibility to only a few 
yards.86 In order to prevent another Essex, the crew of the 
Pittsburg had stacked bags of coal, hammocks, and any 
other materials they could find around the boiler to protect 
it from direct fire.87As the ironclads steamed up to the fort 
with the timberclads in support, Confederate gunners 
managed to hold their fire until the ironclads got within a 
range of about four hundred yards and let loose a hail of 
fire simultaneously.88 Very quickly, chaos broke out as the 
Carondelet started the assault by sending harassing fire into 
the water batteries.  
 Instead of demolishing the batteries, the 
Confederate gunners were instead able to inflict serious 
damage to the point where some believed they had sunk 
Carondelet after she drifted downriver.89 The Carondelet 
had one of its rifled guns explode and was struck in the 
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wheelhouse, jamming the wheel and rendering the ironclad 
useless as she floated back down the river in need of 
extensive repairs.90 The official after action battle reported 
also noted that the Pittsburg had struck off his starboard 
rudder and the Tyler accidentally hit his casemate with a 
shell. The Carondelet reported no injuries after Henry, but 
after Donelson the crew had suffered forty-six wounded 
and four killed.91 
 The St. Louis also suffered, taking a shot through 
the pilothouse that penetrated one and a half inches of iron 
and more than fifteen inches of oak timber.92 Splinters from 
the timber wounded several, including Flag Officer Foote, 
who suffered an injury to the ankle.93 As the ironclads got 
closer, the fort’s batteries were able to fire directly onto 
their decks. Iron-plating on the decks was not very thick 
and the gunboats were mauled as shots penetrated the deck 
and wreaked havoc below. After only ninety minutes of 
firing, the ironclads were forced to retreat. The Carondelet 
alone sent one hundred and thirty-nine shells into the fort 
with minimal damage. Not a single Confederate gun in the 
fort was disabled and not one casualty was reported.94 
 The morale of the Confederate soldiers soared. 
After blowing off the smokestack of the St. Louis, one 
Rebel gunner reportedly shrieked out, “Come on, you 
cowardly scoundrels, you are not at Fort Henry!”95 
Brigadier General Gideon Pillow sent joyous telegrams 
declaring their success in the “fiercest fight on record” with 
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the ironclads.96 A portion of the diary of Captain R.R. 
Ross, a commander of one of the shore batteries, 
reproduced in the Confederate Veteran in 1896, wrote that 
driving back the ironclads was in itself a great victory. Ross 
made it a point to show that the ironclads had failed and 
been soundly defeated.97  
 The failure of the ironclads disappointed Grant, who 
wrote in his memoirs that though at first the enemy had 
been demoralized by the assault, after seeing them driven 
off, their “jubilant” response made him sad. He planned to 
pull back and entrench until the flotilla could get the 
necessary repairs in Cairo.98 General Floyd, however, had 
different ideas. On the night of the 14th, Floyd attempted a 
desperate breakout attempt, hitting the Union right. The 
Federals were able to hold their line but at the loss of an 
estimated 1,200 casualties. The next day, Grant ordered 
Major General C. F. Smith’s Division to charge the 
enemy’s right and then ordered a second assault by Major 
Generals John McClernand and Lew Wallace to commence 
on the enemy’s left.99 
 After the catastrophe of the ironclad assault, a 
demoralized and injured Foote had regrouped his flotilla 
downriver and was ready to drift back to Cairo for repairs. 
Grant, however, ordered any gunboats able should return to 
the fort and fire shells at a distance. Grant wrote that if the 
gunboats simply made an appearance during McClernand 
and Wallace’s attack, their presence alone could shift 
morale, save the reputation of the ironclads, and secure 
victory. When Commander Benjamin Dove, temporarily in 
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command since Foote’s injury, received the message, he 
perceived its importance and immediately took the St. 
Louis, the only ironclad left in an operable condition and 
returned to fire on the fort.100 That night, Brigadier General 
John Floyd, Pillow, and Nathan Bedford Forrest all broke 
out of the fort to avoid capture, leaving Simon Bolivar 
Buckner to surrender and sent a message to Grant 
requesting certain terms.101 Grant, however, replied with 
the now-famous phrase, “no terms except an unconditional 
and immediate surrender can be accepted,” forever earning 
himself the nickname “Unconditional Surrender Grant.”102 
 The descriptions of the ironclads after the Fort 
Henry and Donelson Campaign are perhaps the most 
interesting of all the documents analyzed. On paper, the 
ironclads were embarrassed, destroyed, proven to be 
vulnerable and able to be beaten. That, however, is not the 
story that emerged from the aftermath reports and 
recollections. Instead, if anything, the reputation of the 
ironclads only became more invincible as time passed and 
memories began to form. General Lew Wallace later 
recollected after receiving devastating news that all of the 
ironclads had been disabled, he was overjoyed to hear the 
sound of their guns just as his men were about to assault the 
Rebel line. Wallace said, “While my division was engaged, 
the guns of the fleet opened fire again. I recollect yet the 
positive pleasure the sounds gave me. I recollect thinking, 
too, of the obstinacy and courage of the commodore, and 
how well timed his attack was, if, as I made no doubt, it 
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was made to assist General Smith and myself…”103 
Returning to fire saved the “reputation for invincibility in 
the minds of both the national and rebel armies.”104 
 In these statements, Wallace helped to create and 
essential myth to the legacy of the Western Gunboat 
Flotilla. The Fort Henry and Donelson campaign is not 
remembered as a thrashing of the ironclads but instead as 
the triumph of Grant’s audacity and cutting edge 
technology. John Milligan has made the point that although 
Donelson proved the ironclads were not invincible, it did 
not matter; the psychological damage had already been 
done and the myth had been created.105  In his Memoirs of 
Service Afloat, Ralph Semmes treated the events of 
February 1862 as a foregone conclusion, writing: “When 
the enemy, by means of his gunboats, could send armies up 
the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers, to the heart of 
Tennessee and Alabama, it was folly to think of holding 
Bowling Green, with our limited forces.”106  
 Analyzing the Western Gunboat Flotilla’s 
performance and legacy during the Fort Henry and 
Donelson campaign yields interesting insight into both 
Union and Confederate reactions to the advent of ironclad 
warfare. Born out of uncertainty and doubt, the ironclads 
became a symbol of the invincibility of Yankee industry, 
even when that notion was proven false at Fort Donelson. 
Gunboat technology was still in its infancy in the early days 
of 1862 and yet, despite the trial and error, the ironclads 
loomed larger than life. For some, such as Lew Wallace’s 
infantrymen, this symbol produced inspiration and pride. 
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For others, such as John Beauchamp Jones and Ralph 
Semmes, the ironclads came to represent industrialized 
Yankee villainy. The thrills and fears the ironclads on the 
Fort Henry and Donelson campaign inspired are far more 
essential to the understanding of ironclad legacy and 
memory today than their actual performance in the field. 
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The Memory of Battle Surrounds You Once Again: 
Iowa Grand Army of the Republic Reunions and the 
Formation of a Pro-Union Nationalism, 1886-1949 
 
Peter Bautz 
 
Five years after the Civil War ended, Secretary of 
War William Belknap delivered a keynote address before a 
group of veterans at the 1870 Reunion of the Iowa 
Department of the Grand Army of the Republic (G.A.R.). 
A former Major General in the Union Army and a fellow 
Iowan, he began his address by invoking the memory of the 
war that had recently ended: “In the joyous satisfaction of a 
Union rescued and under the control of peace, you are, in 
imagination, my brothers, in the midst of an Army of which 
you were a part. You are among memories which no 
influences can now dispel.” Belknap then spoke about 
memories of muskets firing, friends falling, and the triumph 
of patriotism. He memorialized valorous Iowans who had 
given their last for their country and reminded the living to 
honor their sacrifice as Lincoln had asked in the Gettysburg 
Address.1 
 Belknap concluded his address with another strong 
reminder about the role of Civil War memory in American 
society. He told the veterans, “History will tell of the deeds 
of those days. Artists will sketch in colors the memorable 
actions which will to all ages illustrate the art and science 
of war. Songs will recount the heroic labors of the Union’s 
brave; but soon of those whom the Nation honored there 
will be only a memory left.” He then reminded veterans 
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that the duty of reminding the nation about what memory 
should be preserved would fall to them as they aged: “[The 
memory of the war], though, will still endure, and as the 
last actors in those scenes, with trembling limbs and 
silvered locks, are singled out as survivors of a patriotic 
Army … children will hasten to gather around them as they 
tell the stories of the days of the great rebellion.” Belknap 
had, in short, instructed the Union veterans before him to 
pass their memories on to the next generation and to ensure 
that the patriotic, Union version of the war was not lost.2 
 Speeches like Belknap’s illustrate how powerful 
veterans were in shaping the memory of the Civil War. 
Veteran societies, like the G.A.R. and the United 
Confederate Veterans (U.C.V.), and their reunions 
buttressed and emboldened their respective section’s 
national myth. Public memory has become an increasingly 
important area of research for historians, who have begun 
to recognize that the creation of memory is often just as 
important as the events that the memory seeks to enshrine.3 
Undervalued in much of the recent public memory work by 
historians of the Civil War has been the impact Union 
veterans had in shaping a pro-Union nationalism. Many 
historians, like Caroline Janney and John Neff, have found 
it difficult to pin down exactly what the pro-Union 
nationalism was. Janney views the nationalism as a 
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reconciliatory, umbrella one which everyone from 
suffragettes to imperialists could get behind.4 These 
definitions of a pro-Union nationalism have been 
unsatisfying at best. But perhaps this difficulty can be 
explained by the fact that most historians have insisted on 
treating the North as one monolithic group. Most works on 
Northern memory include veterans’ memories as part of 
their study but fail to separate them from politicians and 
home front memories of the war. 
 Separating out veterans as a select sub-category of 
the Northern population allows a deeper look at what 
veterans thought about the war in its aftermath. It becomes 
clear when considered separately that veterans created and 
maintained a distinctly pro-Union nationalism which 
undercut Lost Cause claims, reminded the nation that the 
Union fought for the right cause and the Confederacy 
fought for the wrong cause, and argued for the 
remembrance of Union sacrifices but not Confederate 
sacrifice. These themes crop up in many states around the 
country, including Iowa. In particular, publications of the 
Iowa Department of the G.A.R. from its founding in 1868 
to its dissolution in 1949 provide an excellent case study of 
how reunions played a major role in forming a pro-Union 
national identity. 
 
The Grand Army of the Republic 
 In 1866, Major Benjamin Franklin Stephenson and 
Chaplain William Rutledge founded the G.A.R. in Illinois. 
From there, the G.A.R. grew from a small group into a 
large national organization which became a breeding 
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ground for pro-Union nationalism. From its inception, the 
G.A.R. earned the reputation of a bloody-shirt-waving, 
Republican partisan organization for Union veterans.5 Low 
participation rates among veterans forced the G.A.R. to 
undergo a transformation into a fraternal order dedicated to 
a three word motto: “fraternity,” “charity,” “loyalty.”6 The 
new G.A.R. gathered a large number of veterans to the 
organization and by the 1880s could claim over 400,000 
Union veterans among its ranks.7 The late 1880s also saw 
another shift in the G.A.R. as it became one of two Civil 
War veterans’ associations. The rise of the U.C.V. in the 
South at the end of the nineteenth century began the 
dissemination of the Lost Cause in opposition to the pro-
Union nationalism espoused by the G.A.R.8 While 
                                                          
5 State Historical Society of Iowa, The Iowa Department of the Grand 
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continuing to bolster a pro-Union nationalism, the G.A.R. 
campaigned heavily for pension reforms and Republican 
political candidates. In fact, it was often thought that, 
through the end of the nineteenth century, a Republican 
candidate could not secure the party nomination for 
president without G.A.R. support.9 
 However, the G.A.R. provided more than simply 
political support and a voice in government for its 
members. G.A.R. departments were divided into posts, 
serving towns and cities of various sizes. At post buildings, 
veterans would gather to talk about politics, war memories, 
and anything else that might be in vogue.10 The G.A.R. also 
sponsored numerous reunions at the national, state, and 
local levels. These annual reunions were called 
“encampments” and normally involved veterans gathering 
to remember the war and discuss army memories with their 
fellow veterans over the course of a few days. 
Encampments involved a day of formal, official meetings 
and informal campfires at night. Campfires involved 
singing songs, reciting poetry, and listening to informal 
speeches – in other words, the perfect environment to 
facilitate the development of nationalism.11 
 The Iowa G.A.R. was a particularly well organized 
state department of the G.A.R. and was active at the 
national level as well. The Iowa Department kept some of 
the best records of their reunions and was one of the largest 
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and best organized G.A.R. state departments. Iowa 
provided three Commanders-in-Chief of the G.A.R. and 
was prominent at many reunions. Founded in 1868, the 
Iowa Department was the third G.A.R. department to be 
formed, and many national G.A.R. reunions were held in 
the state.12 In short, Iowa was a major participant at all 
levels of G.A.R. reunions. 
 
The Memory Debate and Imagining Communities 
Scholars of Civil War memory have worked to 
formulate an idea of how Americans created imagined 
communities in the aftermath of the Civil War via shared 
experiences. David Blight argues that Confederate and 
Union veterans came together over a shared whiteness, 
forgetting about slavery as a cause of the Civil War in favor 
of a more neutral memory of soldiers’ valorous sacrifice.13 
Christopher Waldrep, likewise, argues that the North 
capitulated to Southern racial views, using the Blue-Grey 
reunion at Vicksburg in 1917 as a case study.14 Some 
scholars have sought to chip away at this reconciliationist 
position. John Neff argues that Union memorial services 
and memorials helped solidify a pro-Union nationalism 
rather than a capitulation to the Lost Cause.15 Barbara 
Gannon emphasizes black integration in the G.A.R., which 
was much more widespread than previously thought, as a 
primary conduit for the formation of a pro-Union 
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nationalism.16 Caroline Janney directly pushes back against 
Blight and argues that the North never forgot that the Civil 
War was fought to free the slaves and that these veterans 
were developing a pro-America nationalism.17 In sum, 
there is an ongoing debate in the historical community 
regarding how much the North capitulated to the South 
over issues of memory. 
All these scholars share one thing in common: a 
focus on memory and the development of nationalism.  
Benedict Anderson’s “imagined communities” framework 
for nationalism provides a useful tool in this case study for 
understanding how Iowa veterans were creating a pro-
Union nationalism. Anderson defines a nation as imagined 
because “members … will never know most of their 
fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in 
the minds of each lives the image of their communion.”18 
He recognizes shared songs, poems, and printed works as 
key to developing the imagined communities – they are the 
tools by which people imagine what their fellows must be 
like. All of these types of community-building activities 
occurred at reunions, making the “imagined communities” 
framework highly useful in evaluating Iowa G.A.R. 
reunions. 
Another common element to these scholars’ work is 
their treatment of the early years of the G.A.R.. None of 
these scholars contest the idea that the G.A.R. was a 
partisan Republican, pro-Union group in its early years.19 
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Disagreement over the level of reconciliation only arises in 
when historians consider the era after the Lost Cause 
emerged in the mid-1880s. For this reason, this study 
focuses on the years 1886-1949 for this study. 
 
The Peak Years of the G.A.R.: 1886-1913 
 By the end of the nineteenth century, the G.A.R. 
had become a vast organization with hundreds of thousands 
of members. These members retained Republican 
allegiances and were responsible for getting numerous 
Republican candidates elected to office.20 As its members 
aged, it became a powerhouse for securing pensions for 
Union veterans and establishing Soldiers’ Homes for poor 
veterans.21 G.A.R. national encampments and national 
campfires became larger and the memories created at these 
events reached wider audiences as the G.A.R. became 
better organized and published more literature for its 
members.22 Here, too, Iowa mirrored larger trends in the 
G.A.R. as Iowa veterans helped get Republican governors, 
senators, and representatives elected. They voted for 
Republican presidential nominees. The Iowa encampment 
journals became longer and contained better notes, and 
Iowa encampments became bigger.23 
 The songs, poems, and speeches at Iowa G.A.R. 
reunions from 1886 to 1913 demonstrate that sectionalism 
                                                                                                                    
reconciliation of the late 1880s onwards. The Iowa G.A.R. was just as 
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20 McConnell, Glorious Contentment, xiv-xvi. 
21 Ibid., xiv-xvi. State Historical Society of Iowa, Iowa Department of 
the Grand Army of the Republic, 23, 37-38. 
22 State Historical Society of Iowa, Iowa Department of the Grand 
Army of the Republic, 23, 37-38. 
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was very much alive well into the twentieth century. When 
the Torrence G.A.R. Post in Keokuk, Iowa, adopted a new 
set of by-laws in 1891 at their annual post reunion, they 
included an introductory section in which they defined the 
three watchwords of the G.A.R.: “fraternity,” “charity,” 
“loyalty.”24 However, it is apparent that fraternity did not 
mean fraternity for all veterans of the Civil War. They 
defined fraternity as bringing together the men who “united 
to suppress the late rebellion” and to “perpetrate [sic] the 
memory and history of the dead.”25 This is hardly a 
definition of reconciliation. Instead, these Iowa veterans 
established a fraternal club that excluded ex-Confederates. 
The most interesting definition they gave, though, was of 
“loyalty”: 
 
To maintain true allegiance to the United States 
of America, based upon a paramount respect for, 
and fidelity to, the National Constitution and 
Laws, to discountenance whatever tends to 
weaken loyalty, incites to insurrection, treason 
or rebellion, or in any manner impairs the 
efficiency and permanency of our free 
institutions.26 
 
Notably, the G.A.R. veterans chose to emphasize their 
position against treason and rebellion – two terms that were 
frequently used to describe Confederates even after the war 
by these veterans. They also chose to emphasize how they 
would protect their free (i.e. not slave) institutions. These 
                                                          
24 By Laws and Roster of Torrence Post No. 2 Grand Army of the 
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lines do not sound like those of an organization dedicated 
to “reconciliation and fraternalism” with their ex-
Confederate counterparts.27 
Iowa G.A.R. members went beyond simply invoking 
sectionalist definitions of their organization at reunions, 
though. They also read poems with a definite pro-Union, 
anti-Confederacy message. At the second reunion of the 
35th Iowa Infantry in 1889, Blair Wolf of Company G rose 
to recite a poem he had written for the occasion. He 
reminded his audience that when “foul rebellion arose in 
the land / … / The Northland stood firm in upholding the 
laws.”28 He argued that the Union had “stood up for 
justice” and “fought for the truth.”29 This recitation was 
“heartily received” with a “storm of applause” according to 
the report of the reunion.30 This type of poem fits well 
within the model Anderson presents in Imagined 
Communities. Wolf invoked the plural “we” to describe his 
fellow Union veterans and reminded them of the cause for 
which they had fought – national unity. The lines of this 
poem celebrate a heroic memory inseparable from the pro-
Union cause.31 These poems were ways for veterans to 
partake in a shared memory of the war and to reaffirm their 
pro-Union nationalism. 
                                                          
27 Blight, Race and Reunion, 198. 
28 Blair Wolf, “Untitled Poem,” in First and Second Re-unions of the 
Thirty-Fifth Iowa Infantry Held at Muscatine, Iowa (Muscatine: 1890), 
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Blair Wolf. 
29 Ibid. 
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 Poems such as these continued to be publicly 
recited at G.A.R. reunions well into the twentieth century. 
At the 1913 Department of Iowa encampment, Henry Field 
of Gordon Granger Post 64 in Grinnell rose to recite a 
poem about the service rendered by Union veterans written 
by a friend who was unable to make the reunion. The poem 
invoked themes of patriotism and loyalty and urged 
veterans to recall how they had fought to see “That the 
wrong might fall forever, / Neath the onward march of 
right.”32 This type of language was repeated often in songs, 
poems, and speeches at Iowa reunions and national 
reunions. His wording is characteristic of other similar 
works which praise the triumph of right over wrong, in 
which freedom for the slaves and restoration of the Union 
were on the side of the right, while treason and slavery 
were on the side of the wrong. By contrasting the two 
forces in terms of right and wrong, Iowa G.A.R. veterans 
created a pro-Union nationalism that rejected treason and 
Confederate sympathies. 
 Iowa veterans also sang songs intended to 
perpetuate the pro-Union imagined community that they 
had created. These songs included patriotic songs, pro-
Union nationalism songs, and anti-Confederate songs. At 
the 1913 Iowa reunion, “Battle Cry of Freedom” was sung 
to wild applause as three veterans paraded across the stage 
wearing Union blue, carrying the Stars and Stripes, and 
brandishing muskets from the war. They sung “The Boys 
Who Wore the Blue,” which celebrates the bravery of 
Union soldiers under heavy fire. Other songs included 
patriotic, pro-America songs like “The Star Spangled 
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Banner” and “Columbia, the Gem of the Ocean.” These 
songs reminded veterans that they had fought for America 
and for a just cause. They also sang pro-Union nationalistic 
songs like “Up with the Flag!” and “Marching through 
Georgia,” which helped solidify the pro-Union nationalism 
of the veterans. Veterans also sang anti-South songs like 
“We Rose a Band of Patriots,” a rewording of the 
Confederate national anthem “Bonnie Blue Flag” which, 
among other things, changed a line about Southern rights 
and liberties into one about “foul treason.”33 These songs 
were clearly intended to take shots at Southern views of the 
war by twisting pro-Confederate words to be anti-
Confederate.  
Yet for all the importance of songs and poems in 
building nationalist ideology, orations both published and 
spoken tell a much more explicit tale of a developing pro-
Union nationalism and pushing back against the Lost 
Cause. Speeches also demonstrate the emerging gap 
between civilians’ and veterans’ memory of the war. As 
years passed, public officials who had not lived during the 
war began to reshape the memory of the war to fit a more 
reconciliatory tone. Veterans, however, never entirely 
accepted this new way of thinking about the war. At the 
War Department, semi-official discrimination occurred 
against Confederate groups during the 1890s led by the 
Secretary of War, Russell Alger. A former G.A.R. 
commander, Alger would, for instance, divert tents to 
G.A.R. reunions while refusing to give any to U.C.V. 
reunions. In the 1910s, a new Secretary of War, Lindley 
Garrison, who had just been born when the war ended, 
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insisted upon equal treatment for all veterans’ groups.34 As 
veterans began to leave public office, their non-veteran 
replacements tended to be more reconciliatory in their 
approach to sectionalism, as can be seen in Iowa. 
 In 1913, both the current governor of Iowa and a 
former governor of Iowa gave speeches to the annual 
encampment of the Iowa G.A.R. at the evening campfires. 
Both men had grown up during the war and were old 
enough to remember the fighting. George Clarke, the sitting 
governor who was thirteen years old when the war ended, 
addressed the veterans first. He invoked Lincoln’s 
Gettysburg Address to remind veterans of the good they did 
in the war. He argued that the Union army had “made 
possible… a great destiny for the United States.”35 He 
highlighted the significance of the results: “No slavery, an 
indissoluble union.”36 Just a few hours later, ex-Governor 
Frank Jackson, who was eleven when the war ended, rose 
to address the veterans, invoking similar imagery and 
themes. He began by telling veterans that he, too, had been 
there – that he had lived through the war just as they had. 
                                                          
34 This conclusion is drawn from careful analysis of press copies of 
letters sent by the Secretaries of War from 1896 to 1913. For instance, 
in 1897, a U.C.V. reunion was denied access to Department tents for 
use at their reunion under the claim that some tents had been provided 
for the general festival where the reunion was to occur and that the rest 
of the tents were needed elsewhere. Two days later, a similar request 
from the G.A.R. was approved and the tents which had been 
“unavailable” were diverted to the G.A.R. reunion instead. By 1913, 
the Secretary began chastising G.A.R. veterans for trying to valorize 
the Union too much over the Confederacy on a monument.  Press 
Copies of Letters Sent, War Department, 1896-1913, record group 107, 
entry A1 82, National Archives, Washington, D.C. 
35 George W. Clark, “Address to the Iowa Department of the G.A.R.,” 
Journal of the Thirty-ninth Annual Encampment, 120. 
36 Ibid., 121. 
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This created a shared space where an imagined community 
could be built. He then went on to talk about how the 
veterans had “licked the Southern Confederacy” and could 
still play an active role in upholding the doctrine of “human 
liberty” and progress as championed by the Republican 
party. His speech was a call to the victorious veterans to 
embrace the South to “reunite” the country but not failing 
to be watchful of the South nonetheless.37  
Veteran rhetoric remained pro-Union, but other 
civilian leaders who had not lived during the war, such as 
Mayor James Hanna of Des Moines, focused their speeches 
on sacrifice and duty, two motifs of the reconciliationist 
camp of Civil War memory.38 Hanna began his address to 
the 1913 Encampment of the Iowa G.A.R. in Des Moines 
by calling the 1860s a “heroic age… filled with heroic 
issues and heroic deeds.” He went on to remind veterans of 
“the sacrifices and deeds of that time” which would inspire 
generations to come. He even went so far as to hint that the 
veterans were unjustly biased in their sectionalism, saying 
“We are sometimes too close to things to see them fully.”39 
Noticeably absent from Hanna’s address are any references 
to the triumph of the Union, Southern traitors, and the 
rebellion that was the war. Union veterans called the Civil 
War “the rebellion” or “treason;” Hanna termed it the 
“situation” or the “great issues of the country.” 40 He spent 
more time emphasizing shared sacrifice and heroism than 
anything else. Clearly, Hanna had bought into the idea of 
reconciliation. 
                                                          
37 Frank Jackson, “Address to the Iowa Department of the G.A.R.,” 
Journal of the Thirty-ninth Annual Encampment, 139-141. 
38 James Hanna, “Address to the Iowa Department of the G.A.R.,” 
Journal of the Thirty-ninth Annual Encampment, 122-123. 
39 Hanna, “Address to the Iowa Department of the G.A.R.,” 122. 
40 Ibid., 122-23. 
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 Another good example of this civilian-veteran 
divide came in the form of how Iowa veterans reacted to 
the praise showered on the memory of Robert E. Lee by 
Northerners and Southerners alike on the one hundredth 
anniversary of his birth in 1907. When a New York 
magazine, Collier’s Weekly, published an editorial 
valorizing Lee in 1907, Iowa veterans blasted the editorial 
in a pamphlet which was circulated to all G.A.R. posts 
around the country. Collier’s wrote that “America has had 
no nobler citizen,” calling Lee “grave, strong, devoted” and 
asking all Americans North and South to rally behind 
him.41 To the Iowa G.A.R. Patriotic Instructor, Robert 
Kissick, these eulogies were “teaching false patriotism.”42 
He laid into Collier’s in an editorial he sent in response and 
in a pamphlet that was circulated to G.A.R. posts around 
the country. He argued that Lee had been “a traitor” and 
likened him to Benedict Arnold, the infamous turncoat of 
the Revolutionary War.43 He went on to quote the 
responses of numerous veterans from Iowa to his article. 
W. D. Kinser, for instance, was disgusted that anyone 
would honor a traitor who fought to prop up a government 
founded on slavery. This pattern held true for most Iowa 
veterans who either criticized Lee as an uncaring traitor 
who backed the moral evil of slavery or sent simple letters 
of concurrence with Kissick’s opinions.44  
As politicians and civilian publications moved 
towards reconciliation, veterans, like those in the Iowa 
G.A.R., continued to maintain a pro-Union nationalism that 
                                                          
41 “Robert E. Lee,” Collier’s Weekly, Vol. 38, No. 17 (January 1907), 
quoted in Robert Kissick, The Duty and Necessity of Teaching True 
American Patriotism (Des Moines: J. H. Welch Printing Co., 1907), 9. 
42 Kissick, Teaching True American Patriotism, 7. 
43 Kissick, Teaching True American Patriotism, 10-12. 
44 Ibid., 13-19. 
Bautz 
70 
 
fought to beat back the reconcilationist views of civilians. 
While civilians lavished praise on Southern heroes, Iowa 
veterans were busy singing anti-Confederacy songs, 
reading poems about how Southerners were traitors, and 
reciting speeches about the patriotism of Union veterans.45 
Historians claim that reconciliatory rhetoric arose during 
this period, but records from Iowa G.A.R. encampments 
reveal that veterans remained sectional, sometimes strongly 
so, even in the twentieth century. This pattern continued 
even as the rest of the country tried to move beyond the 
sectionalism of the Civil War Era. 
 
The G.A.R. In Decline: 1913-1956 
 Although most historians view the G.A.R. as a 
slowly declining power relegated to Memorial Day 
commemorations and the occasional sentimental Blue-Gray 
reunions after 1913, Iowa G.A.R. reunions demonstrate that 
veterans still actively promoted a pro-Union nationalism, 
albeit with slightly altered rhetoric and actions.46 It is true 
that the declining population of veterans meant that grand 
reunions occurred less frequently. Historians are correct in 
arguing that the power of the national G.A.R. was on the 
decline. The last large national G.A.R. encampment 
occurred in 1922 in Iowa, and it was billed as such.47 It was 
                                                          
45 The editors at Collier’s Weekly were just one example of this 
phenomenon of civilians praising Southern heroes. Theodore Roosevelt 
in his 1907 address in Washington, D.C. on the anniversary of Lee’s 
birthday praised Lee as an American hero and one of America’s 
greatest generals. 
46 McConnell, Glorious Contentment, xvi. Blight, Race and Reunion  ¸
198-201. It should be noted that Blight essentially sees the G.A.R. as 
early as the mid-1890s. 
47 State Historical Society of Iowa, Iowa Department of the Grand 
Army of the Republic, 25. The 1922 G.A.R. reunion in Des Moines was 
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at this reunion that, for the second time in the history of the 
G.A.R., an Iowan became Commander-in-Chief of the 
G.A.R.. By 1917, the Iowa G.A.R. membership had 
dwindled to a few thousand veterans. This did not mean the 
G.A.R. had lost all its power, though. Indeed, local posts 
such as those in Iowa continued to push for the placement 
of American flags in every classroom and other such 
patriotic activities. In other words, although the Iowa 
Department was in decline in terms of members, it retained 
considerable public influence. 
The report of William Johnson, the Department of 
Iowa G.A.R. Patriotic Instructor, at the 1917 state reunion 
gives a good glimpse at the work the Iowa G.A.R. was 
undertaking to promote patriotism in the state. The report 
includes a list from the national office with responses from 
the Iowa Patriotic Instructor. Of note are the following 
details: of the forty-three posts in Iowa in 1917, thirty-six 
had provided over 300 American flags for placement in 
every school in their area, all posts ensured that a state law 
requiring the flag to be raised at school every day was 
enforced, most posts ensured that the Pledge of Allegiance 
was said daily in those schools, all posts ensured that 
“patriotic days” were observed in schools, and most posts 
reported on how Memorial Day was observed at schools 
and in towns.48 These actions held a special significance for 
                                                                                                                    
billed as “The Last Great Encampment.” The last G.A.R. reunion was 
held in 1949 with a scant six attendees. 
48 Iowa Grand Army of the Republic, Journal of the Forty-third Annual 
Encampment Department of Iowa Grand Army of the Republic at 
Davenport (Des Moines: J. H. Welch Printing Co., 1917), 46-47. Of the 
206 schools in the state, 160 reported to statistics to Johnson. “Patriotic 
Days” included Lincoln’s Birthday, Washington’s Birthday, Memorial 
Day, and Flag Day. The Fourth of July is conspicuously absent from 
the list. 
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the pro-Union nationalism that these veterans were trying 
to promote – they pushed for the Union to be celebrated in 
every classroom, reminding students that they were part of 
one nation under one flag because the Union had won the 
war. 
The placement of flags and other pro-Union 
imagery was a way for local posts to solidify pro-Union 
nationalism even as the national G.A.R.’s power declined. 
Flags and national symbols play a large role in the creation 
of imagined communities. Anderson notes, “Out of the 
American welter came these imagined realities: nation-
states, republican institutions, common citizenships… 
national flags and anthems, etc.”49 That G.A.R. veterans 
were working to ensure that national flags and pledges 
were in schools speaks powerfully to the nation-building 
occurring through the G.A.R.. But it was a pro-Union 
nationalism that the G.A.R. was trying to foster. Alongside 
the flag, the Iowa G.A.R. placed copies of Lincoln’s 
Gettysburg Address to assert to a new generation that the 
Union had fought to free slaves and protect the country.50 
Students would celebrate the Union Memorial Day, not the 
Confederate ones.51 Rather than simply being a Memorial 
Day organization after 1913, the G.A.R. worked feverishly 
to ensure that the pro-Union nationalism they had fostered 
among themselves would be passed on to future 
generations. 
                                                          
49 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 81. 
50 Iowa G.A.R., Journal of the Forty-third Annual Encampment, 46. 
51 Confederates and many Southern states tended to celebrate a 
Southern Memorial Day which varied from the day Lee surrendered to 
Jeff Davis’ birthday.  “8 Things You May Not Know About Memorial 
Day,” History Channel’s History in the Headlines, last modified May 
24, 2013, accessed March 25, 2015, http://www.history.com/news/8-
things-you-may-not-know-about-memorial-day 
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As World War I approached, veterans continued to 
give pro-Union speeches, but now they emphasized their 
status as ‘true’ patriots during the Civil War in contrast to 
the Confederates. For example, Colonel Palmer, one of the 
last surviving officers from Sherman’s staff, rose at the 
1917 Iowa reunion and reminded veterans of their wartime 
experiences. He attacked Southerners when he announced 
to the men that though he had not voted for President 
Wilson, he would stand by him during World War I like a 
true patriot.52On the surface this may not appear to be 
overly insulting, but when considered alongside Southern 
secession after Lincoln’s election in 1860, the true 
implication of Palmer’s statement becomes clear. Palmer 
went on to rebut claims by the Daughters of Confederate 
Veterans (D.C.V.) and the U.C.V. that terrible prison 
conditions existed in the North and South. He reminded 
veterans that unlike Confederates, “When we captured 
[Confederates] they were cared for… and cared for 
humanely.”53 This is hardly the kind of comparison a 
reconciliationist would make. The constant harkening back 
to proud Union victories in speeches by G.A.R. members 
encompassed both a patriotic furor for the U.S. in World 
War I and a pro-Union nationalism that was meant to 
bolster the support of Union veterans. 
In stark contrast to Palmer’s speech, William 
Harding, the governor of Iowa and a man who had not lived 
during the war, told veterans to put aside their political and 
sectional differences to support the war effort during the 
First World War and not to be concerned with the 
president’s Southern roots and Democratic support – only 
                                                          
52 David Palmer, “Address to the Iowa Department of the G.A.R.,” 
Journal of the Forty-third Annual Encampment, 161. 
53 Ibid., 162. 
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with being patriotic in the war. His emphasis on sacrifice 
and duty were reconciliationist.54 Harding attempted to 
instill a reconciliatory joint patriotism of the sort Blight 
identifies. 
The songs sung at the 1917 Davenport reunion that 
later appeared in an Iowa G.A.R. songbook in 1923 
retained their pro-Union nationalist bent. One veteran sang 
songs about how the flag that made America free in 1776 
was the same flag that freed the slave and crushed the 
rebellion. He also sang songs of how the recitation of the 
Pledge of Allegiance in the South was a reminder that the 
Union had triumphed in the end.55 The songs appearing the 
Iowa G.A.R. songbook included the patriotic songs 
“America” and “Battle Hymn of the Republic” and the pro-
Union songs “Battle Cry of Freedom” and “Marching 
through Georgia.” In fact, pro-Union songs make up half of 
the five-page song book.56  
After the World War I Era, the Iowa G.A.R.’s 
numbers continued to decline as did the frequency of their 
reunions. By 1935, only a few hundred members remained. 
In 1948, the last Iowa veteran of the Civil War died, and 
after a brief memorial reunion in 1949, the Iowa 
Department of the G.A.R. was disbanded.57 Nevertheless, it 
is clear from the reunions that did occur that pro-Union 
nationalism was still alive and well during the waning years 
                                                          
54 William Harding, “Address to the Iowa Department of the G.A.R.,” 
Journal of the Forty-third Annual Encampment, 145-154. 
55Iowa G.A.R.,  Journal of the Forty-third Annual Encampment, 182-
183. 
56 Iowa G.A.R., Songs of the Grand Army of the Republic and Auxiliary 
Organizations Iowa Department (Fort Dodge: Essenger Printing Co., 
1923), 1-5. 
57 Ibid., 35-48; Iowa Grand Army of the Republic, Journal of the 
Seventy-fifth Annual Encampment of the Iowa Department of the Grand 
Army of the Republic (Des Moines: Unnamed Publisher, 1949). 
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of the Iowa G.A.R.. Not even the collective national spirit 
of World War I was able to completely eradicate it in favor 
of the umbrella nationalism Janney argues for. 
 
Conclusion 
 From its founding in 1868 to its dissolution in 1949, 
the Iowa Department of the G.A.R. played a major role in 
shaping a pro-Union nationalism among Iowa veterans at 
reunions and through pamphlets. The reunions of Iowa 
G.A.R. veterans demonstrate how sectionalism and pro-
Union nationalism lingered in the G.A.R. well into the 
twentieth century. During the early years of the G.A.R., 
Iowans began creating a pro-Union nationalism founded on 
the idea that the right had triumphed over the wrong. They 
sang pro-Union songs and wrote pro-Union poems. During 
the 1880s to 1910s, Iowans continued the traditions they 
began in the early days of the G.A.R. singing pro-Union 
songs and giving sectionalist speeches. Even in the later 
days of the G.A.R., Iowa veterans continued to promote a 
pro-Union nationalism by demonstrating true patriotism in 
supporting a president during war regardless of party and 
having flags and pro-Union articles, such as the Gettysburg 
Address, disseminated in schools around the state. As 
Secretary of War Belknap had noted in 1870, these Union 
veterans were surrounding themselves with “the memories 
of battle … once again.”58 
  
                                                          
58 William Belknap, “Address of General Wm. W. Belknap Secretary 
of War at the Re-union of Iowa Soldiers, Des Moines, Iowa,” August 
31, 1870, 14-16. 
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Ambrose Burnside, the Ninth Army Corps, and the 
Battle of Spotsylvania Court House 
 
Ryan T. Quint 
 
Spring had come and that meant that the 
bloodletting could begin anew. For Major General 
Ambrose Everett Burnside that campaign commenced on 
April 13, 1864 when he arrived in Annapolis, Maryland to 
rendezvous with his Ninth Army Corps.1 Around the city 
that was home to the U.S. Naval Academy the soldiers in 
the corps’ three divisions milled about, drilling and 
organizing. Most of the men in the divisions were brand 
new recruits, learning the school of the soldier for the first 
time. These recruits were shuffled into regiments shrunken 
by years of arduous fighting for the Union all the way from 
the North Carolina Coast in the spring of 1862 to, most 
recently, the Siege of Knoxville.2 
 The same day that Burnside arrived in Annapolis he 
paraded the Ninth Corps in review for recently-promoted 
Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant.3 As general-in-chief 
                                                          
1 William Marvel, Burnside (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1991), 345.  
2 Augustus Woodbury, Major General Ambrose E. Burnside and the 
Ninth Army Corps: A Narrative of Campaigns (Providence: Sidney S. 
Rider & Brother, 1867), 365, 367; William F. Fox, Regimental Losses 
in the American Civil War (Albany: Albany Publishing Company, 
1889), 81-83.  
3 A word on the convention of writing out Federal corps is useful here. 
Though the practice of identifying Federal corps with Roman numerals 
is the accepted practice today, during the war the corps were identified 
with either regular numbers or were spelled out. I also agree with the 
late Harry Pfanz, who wrote that “[F]or me…Roman numerals always 
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of the United States Army, it was expected that he would 
have set up his headquarters in the nation’s capital, but 
Grant decided to take the field. Grant found the Ninth 
Corps in “an admirable position for such a reinforcement.” 
From its location Burnside’s men “could be brought at the 
last moment as a reinforcement to the Army of the 
Potomac, or it could be thrown on the sea-coast, south of 
Norfolk, in Virginia, or North Carolina, to operate against 
Richmond from that direction.” Though Grant had 
witnessed these soldiers pass in review this was hardly the 
reason he had come all the way to Annapolis from his field 
headquarters near Culpeper; rather it was to “confer with 
Burnside about the role the Ninth Corps would play in the 
spring campaign….”4 
 That role, Burnside soon found out, was to support 
the Army of the Potomac with an overland march. On April 
23 the Ninth Corps packed up its tents and formed into 
marching columns. To the surprise of many of the soldiers, 
the corps began to march towards Washington, D.C., not 
down to the Annapolis docks. It had made its fame on a 
naval expedition against North Carolina’s Outer Banks in 
1862 and still had the legacy to prove it: its insignia was an 
anchor and cannon, crossed over a shield. Many expected 
to repeat their success at sea with another strike at a rebel 
                                                                                                                    
require a pause for translation that snags my train of thought.” Harry 
W. Pfanz, Gettysburg: The Second Day (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1987), xvii.  
4 Ulysses S. Grant, Memoirs and Selected Letters (New York: Literary 
Classics of the United States, 1990 reprint), 477; Brooks D. Simpson, 
Ulysses S. Grant: Triumph Over Adversity, 1822-1865 (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 2000), 271.  
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target.5 But this coming campaign would involve no ships 
for the Ninth Corps, only grueling marches and hard 
fighting.  
 As the corps neared Washington City a fourth 
division, consisting entirely of United States Colored 
Troops, was added to the corps. Burnside’s command was 
now composed of close to 21,000 men and 72 cannons 
ready for action.6 Entering the capital, the corps marched 
past throngs of cheering crowds while the divisions’ “soiled 
and tattered flags, bearing inscriptions of battles in six 
states, east and west, were silent and affecting witnesses of 
their valor and their sacrifices.”7 Crossing Long Bridge into 
Virginia, the corps continued its march until, by May 5, 
they were closing in on the Army of the Potomac. As the 
regiments neared the battlefield, one man later wrote, 
“Every soldier knew that we were about to participate in a 
battle, as the booming of cannon and the rattle of musketry 
were heard long before... The trail of the regiments 
preceding us was made plain by the thousands of playing 
cards strewn along the wayside, which they had discarded 
from their blouse pockets to make room for their 
                                                          
5 For the naval expedition, see Marvel, 41-97; for the corps insignia see 
C. McKeever, Civil War Battle flags of the Union Army and Order of 
Battle (New York: Knickerbocker Press, 1997 reprint), 81-82.  
6 Darrell L. Collins, Army of the Potomac: Order of Battle, 1861-1865, 
with Commanders, Strengths Losses, and More (Jefferson: McFarland 
& Company, 2013), 168. 
7 Woodbury, 368.  
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testaments, which had reposed unopened, in many cases, 
for weeks, in their knapsacks.”8 
 For Ambrose Burnside, the march to join the Army 
of the Potomac would not have marshaled good memories. 
He had last seen the army after resigning its command 
following the horrific defeat at Fredericksburg in 
December, 1862, followed immediately by the 
embarrassing “Mud March.” As Burnside prepared to leave 
the army in early 1863, he remarked, “Farewell Gentlemen, 
there are no pleasant reminiscences for me connected with 
the Army of the Potomac.”9 For its part, the Army of the 
Potomac was not sorry to see Burnside to go, and blamed 
the side-whiskered general wholeheartedly for its bloody 
defeat. 
 Now, in the spring of 1864, Burnside was returning 
to the Army of the Potomac, and it was already creating 
problems. The most serious matter was that of seniority—
with Burnside’s return he should, by his commission’s date, 
assume command of the Army of the Potomac, taking it 
away from George Meade. Burnside had been 
commissioned a major general of volunteers to date from 
March 18, 1862, while Meade did not attain the same rank 
                                                          
8 Allen D. Albert, editor, History of the Forty-Fifth Regiment 
Pennsylvania Veteran Volunteer Infantry 1861-1865 (Williamsport, 
PA: Grit Publishing Company, 1912), 114.  
9 A. Wilson Greene, “Morale, Maneuver, and Mud” in Gary W. 
Gallagher, The Fredericksburg Campaign: Decision on the 
Rappahannock (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995), 
215; Francis A. O’Reilly, The Fredericksburg Campaign: Winter War 
on the Rappahannock (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 
2003), 495-496.  
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until November 29 of the same year.10 No one expected or 
would have allowed for Burnside to take command of the 
army, and Grant settled on an independent structure for the 
Ninth Corps— Burnside would report directly to Grant and 
get orders from him while the other three infantry corps 
would answer to Meade. It was a clunky system that would 
prove largely ineffective—especially at Spotsylvania, 
whose bloodiest fighting lay just under a week away.11 
 The second problem facing Burnside’s return to the 
Army of the Potomac, even with his independent 
command, was the fact that no one within the army had any 
confidence in him. Though beyond the scope of this 
narrative the second day of the Battle of the Wilderness on 
May 6, 1864 is worth mentioning in passing only because it 
shows the lack of confidence and low expectations that 
army officers had for Burnside. On the Federal left 
Winfield Scott Hancock’s Second Corps crashed through 
the woods and hit elements of A.P. Hill’s Confederates—
some of the same rebels that Burnside would fight at 
Spotsylvania in six days’ time. As Burnside’s corps was 
coming up, his three divisions, led by Thomas Stevenson, 
Robert Potter, and Orlando Willcox, were all ordered 
                                                          
10 George W. Cullum, Biographical Register of Officers and Graduates 
of the U.S. MMilitary Academy , at West Point, N.Y: Volume II (New 
York: D. Van Nostrand, 1868), 191; George W. Cullum, Biographical 
Regster of the Officers and Graduates of the Military Academy at West 
Point, N.Y., Volume I (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1868),   
11 Gordon C. Rhea, The Battle of the Wilderness May 5-6, 1864 (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1994), 48. 
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forward.12 But in the thick confines of the Wilderness the 
troops were given unclear directions and “bushwhacked 
toward their indistinct goal,” as one historian writes.13 
Another historian, Gordon C. Rhea, wrote that “For the rest 
of the morning, the [Ninth] Corps remained lost to the 
Federal war effort. Occasionally messages emerged from 
the undergrowth, but the troops themselves seemed to have 
been swallowed up by the Wilderness.”14 
 To the men and officers of the Army of the Potomac 
though, it mattered little that the three divisions got lost. 
What they remembered was the fact that when they needed 
support, Burnside came up short. As Theodore Lyman, aide 
to George Meade, met with Hancock, he reported that 
Burnside was slowly making progress, to which the Second 
Corps commander bellowed, “I knew it…. Just what I 
expected.”15 One of Hancock’s staff officers wrote years 
later that when Burnside did finally get into action, 
“assistance it could hardly be called, for, when Burnside at 
last made his attack, Hancock had already been driven 
back….”16 Charles Wainwright, an artillery officer in the 
Fifth Corps, wrote in his diary, “Burnside somehow is 
                                                          
12 The Fourth Division, commanded by Edward Ferrero, was detached 
and did not take part in the Battle of the Wilderness. See Burnside’s 
report, Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies in the 
War of the Rebellion, Series 1, Vol. 36, pt. 1, 906 (hereafter cited as 
OR, followed by part, volume, and page number—all series are 1).  
13 Marvel, Burnside, 355. 
14 Rhea, Wilderness, 331.  
15 Theodore Lyman, Meade’s Headquarters 1863-1865 (Boston: 
Atlantic Monthly Press, 1922), 94. 
16 Francis A. Walker, History of the Second Army Corps in the Army of 
the Potomac (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1886), 427. 
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never up to the mark when the tug comes.” Wainwright 
also commented on Burnside’s subordinate officers, saying, 
“I got a very poor impression of the corps.”17 
 Following the tactical stalemate at the Wilderness, 
which resulted in little other than close to 30,000 casualties, 
Grant decided to shift his forces south, towards 
Spotsylvania Court House. Burnside’s men moved back 
towards Chancellorsville and then began sliding further 
south, reaching the Fredericksburg Road on May 9. This 
road ran straight from Fredericksburg to Grant’s objective 
of Spotsylvania Court House. When Burnside’s men 
reached the road, they now served as the Federals’ left 
flank.18  
 With Orlando Willcox’s division leading the way 
down the Fredericksburg Road, Burnside soon a problem 
that would plague the entire Federal command. Bad maps 
had been distributed before the campaign began and now, 
with Grant trying to issue orders to both Burnside and 
Meade’s Army of the Potomac, the problems associated 
with those maps bubbled to the surface. First was the maps’ 
quality—Theodore Lyman wrote that the maps were 
                                                          
17 Charles W. Wainwright, A Diary of Battle, edited by Allan Nevins 
(Cambridge: Da Capo Press, 1998), 352.  
18 On the Wilderness’ casualties, see Noah Andre Trudeau, Bloody 
Roads South: The Wilderness to Cold Harbor, May-June 1864 (New 
York: Ballantine Books, 1989), 341; on the movement of the Ninth 
Corps see Burnside’s OR, Vol. 36, pt. 1, 907-908; Spotsylvania Court 
House serving as Grant’s objective can be found in Gordon C. Rhea, 
The Battles for Spotsylvania Court House and the Road to Yellow 
Tavern: May 7-12, 1864 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 
Press, 1997), 13.  
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printed “on wretched spongy paper, which wore out after 
being carried a few days in the pocket….” Furthermore, 
Lyman pointed out that many of the maps had key points 
on them entirely out of position—pertinent to the Battle of 
the Spotsylvania Court House was the fact that the 
courthouse itself was portrayed “two and one half miles to 
the west [from where it is actually located].”19 
 Most problematic to Burnside on May 9 was the 
issue of the location of a “Gate”, as well as the Gayle 
house. This problem would resonate through the next 
couple of days of the battle, culminating with the fighting 
on May 12. Grant issued orders to Burnside, ordering him 
to send “a small force from Gate toward Spotsylvania to 
reconnoiter the roads and enemy’s position in that 
direction, and especially have all roads leading to your 
right… examined… and whether they lead to the positions 
occupied by General Meade’s forces…..”20  In other words, 
Willcox, whose division was leading the corps, was to 
skirmish ahead and see which roads, if any, could link up 
with the Army of the Potomac so that the Federal line could 
be one solid front.  
 There are numerable problems with this order, but 
the main concern is the usage of “Gate.” Going back to the 
horrendous maps, it appears that “Gate” was mentioned on 
both Grant’s and Meade’s maps, but not Burnside’s. The 
choice to write Gate as a proper noun also implies that 
                                                          
19 Theodore Lyman, “Uselessness of Maps,” in The Wilderness 
Campaign May-June 1864, Volume IV (Boston: The Military Historical 
Society of Massachusetts), 79-80.  
20 OR, Vol. 36, pt. 2, 580.  
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Grant and Meade both believed that the Gate was the 
property of a local. There was indeed a gate along the Ninth 
Corps’ advance, but it was just that—a toll gate, not a large 
house, and furthermore, it was far to the rear of Willcox’s 
advance. Nonetheless, Willcox pushed on ahead, towards 
the Gayle house, a structure on the north-eastern side of the 
river. There his skirmishers ran into Confederate pickets of 
infantry and dismounted cavalry and the two sides began to 
open a lively fire. Willcox reported back to Burnside that 
he had “Found the enemy’s vedettes one-half mile before 
reaching Gayle’s house.”21 Reporting back to Grant, 
Burnside reiterated the “Gayle” house. And then, in a snafu 
classic for military history, both Grant and Burnside 
assumed the other was misspelling the g-word—whether it 
was “Gate” or “Gayle” and neither asked for clarification. 
It didn’t help that on the map that Grant possessed, the gate 
was marked where the Gayle house actually stood.22  
 At the end of the day on May 9, Willcox had 
nonetheless pushed across the Ni River and drove away the 
Confederate pickets. From his current position Willcox was 
only about 1.5 miles away from Spotsylvania Court House, 
and ahead of him lay just more Confederate pickets—had 
the Third Division pressed down the road, the likelihood of 
capturing the courthouse and its vital crossroads was very 
                                                          
21 OR, Vol. 36, pt. 2, 581; for detailed topographic maps of the 
Spotsylvania area, see map series “Battle of Spotsylvania Court 
House”, produced by Steven Stanley, 2000. 
22 William D. Matter, If It Takes All Summer: The Battle of 
Spotsylvania (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988), 
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high. The Federal high command’s faulty cartography 
depicted the distance between the Ni River crossing and 
Spotsylvania as 3.5 miles, however. Gordon C. Rhea 
summarizes this whole episode as “Burnside missed a 
superb opportunity.”23 Later that night Burnside finally 
tried to clear up the confusion, writing, “The position 
occupied by General Willcox is at Mr. Gayle’s house, there 
being no such place as Gate in this section….”24 The note 
apparently did not stick; in his postwar history of the 
campaign, Meade’s chief of staff Andrew Humphreys 
wrote that “General Burnside moved with the Ninth 
Corps… to Gate’s house, on the road from [Spotsylvania] 
Court House to Fredericksburg, and then toward the Court 
House, crossing the [Ni] at Gate’s house (a mile and a half 
from the Court House)….” 25  At least by the 1880s 
Humphreys had learned the true distance from the river to 
Spotsylvania.  
 If May 9 had been difficult for Burnside in trying to 
get through the ambiguous orders, May 10 was difficult 
because Burnside lost his “ablest division commander.”26 
Brigadier General Thomas Stevenson brought his First 
Division forward to support Willcox’s command in 
solidifying their front on the southern side of the Ni River. 
Seeking some shade (the mercury recorded 89 degrees at 2 
                                                          
23 Matter, 110; Rhea, Spotsylvania, 103.  
24 Burnside to Grant, OR, Vol. 36, pt. 2, 583. 
25 Humphreys, The Virginia Campaign of 1864-1865 (New York: 
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1883), 72.  
26 Rhea, Spotsylvania, 182. 
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PM in Washington City—65 miles north),27 Stevenson 
lounged about and smoked cigars with his staff. Then, 
breaking the brief reprieve in an extremely bloody fashion, 
a bullet cracked through the back of Stevenson’s head, 
toppling him over. The twenty-eight year old Brigadier 
General was dead almost instantly. Burnside wrote that 
Stevenson’s death was a “severe misfortune” and that the 
general had “on all occasions proved himself an efficient 
soldier.”28 As Stevenson’s body was sent back to Boston, 
Colonel Daniel Leasure took over command of the First 
Division. One of his new staff officers wrote, “I had a 
favorable opinion of him, but I can’t say I retain it.”29 Over 
the course of the next day Burnside was hesitant to further 
use the division under Leasure. 
 By May 10, the Battle of Spotsylvania Court House 
was into its third day. By this point of the battle 
Confederate engineers had laid out their defensive works—
the most famous being the Mule Shoe Salient. Measuring 
“1,800 yards wide at the base and 1,320 yards deep from 
the base to the tip”,30 the Mule Shoe was truly massive and 
also proved to be a liability for its Confederate defenders; a 
salient can be attacked from three sides at once, making it 
                                                          
27 Robert K. Krick, Civil War Weather in Virginia (Tuscaloosa: 
University of Alabama Press, 2007), 129. 
28 Derek Smith, The Gallant Dead: Union and Confederate Generals 
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difficult to defend. As Lee’s line continued, the 
Confederate engineers followed the natural contour lines of 
the ridge they were on and dug a second salient, this one “a 
minor protrusion in comparison [to the Mule Shoe]… The 
trench was over five feet deep, and pine logs topped the 
parapet.”31 This second salient would be guarded mostly by 
men of Henry Heth’s division, thus the position got its 
name—Heth’s Salient. These works would soon become 
the focus of major Federal attacks. 
 There was little fighting on Burnside’s front on May 
11, but plenty of maneuvering. As Grant planned his big 
offensive against Lee’s line for the next day, the Ninth 
Corps spent the majority of the day re-crossing the Ni River 
back to the north side. In the midst of driving rain storms, 
this proved difficult to do. Once the high command realized 
what was going on, the corps was ordered to re-cross the 
river again and regain their works on the south side of the 
river. The end result was that the Ninth Corps spent the 
majority of May 11 in the rain marching back and forth 
only to end up in the exact same place as they had started, 
only now exhausted and soaked to the bone. Burnside 
denied ordering the move, as did Grant—historian William 
Matter writes that “Until more evidence is uncovered, this 
episode will remain a mystery.”32  
 In the meantime, the soldiers of the Ninth Corps 
suffered for the lack of shelter. One solder in the 57th 
Massachusetts wrote, “The afternoon of the 11th [of May] 
                                                          
31 Hess, Trench Warfare under Grant and Lee, 58-59. 
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was rainy, which continued through the night. The Fifty-
Seventh rested upon their arms without shelter of any kind, 
the ground was wet and the men’s clothing also, with no 
opportunity of getting dry; sleep was impossible….”33 
Another soldier in the 7th Rhode Island added, “The rain 
poured in torrents over the hundreds lying around. Few had 
blankets.”34 For all of their marches, the soldiers did not 
reach their trenches until about 10:00 PM, which meant 
they had about six hours to lie around in the mud until 
going forward.35  
 While the Ninth Corps moved about and struggled 
with the elements, Burnside got his orders for the next 
day’s attack. Grant’s message to Burnside was time-
stamped at 4:00 PM, but the latter probably did not get the 
order “until near dark”—sunset on May 11 was three 
minutes shy of 7:00 PM.36 In his orders, Grant wrote that 
“You will move against the enemy with your entire force 
promptly and with all possible vigor at precisely 4 o’clock 
to-morrow morning. Let your preparations for this attack be 
conducted with the utmost secrecy, and veiled entirely from 
the enemy.”37 To assist Burnside, Grant ordered two of his 
                                                          
33 John Anderson, The Fifty-Seventh Regiment of Massachusetts 
Volunteers in the War of the Rebellion (Boston: E.B. Stillings & Co., 
1896), 80. 
34 William Palmer Hopkins, The Seventh Regiment Rhode Island 
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aides, Cyrus Comstock and Orville Babcock, to attach 
themselves to the Ninth Corps staff and direct the attacks.  
 After getting his orders Burnside began to plan his 
corps’ attacks. Some have criticized Burnside for his lack 
of overall preparations in these stages of the battle—one 
historian writes that he was “befuddled” and “dithered” in 
front of the enemy on May 10, and he characterized 
Burnside’s fighting on May 12 as “a spectacle of 
embarrassing confusion.”38 Ambrose Burnside serves as an 
easy target for these historians as the debacle at 
Fredericksburg will always stain his name, but it is unfair 
to claim that Burnside did nothing but spew incompetence; 
in the midst of the Ninth Corps’ preparations on the night 
of May 11 it is important to remember Grant’s warning to 
keep the movements an “utmost secrecy, and veiled 
entirely from the enemy,” a line that his two aides also 
reiterated.39 In this setting, it is easy to understand why 
Burnside was hesitant to send scouts forward to reconnoiter 
the ground, especially when Comstock, one of the aides 
from Grant, had already done so earlier in the day, could 
provide Burnside with whatever directions the he needed. 
Furthermore, after arriving at Burnside’s headquarters in 
the dark, “Comstock suggested no reconnaissance.”40 
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 In the midst of all this, another curveball was 
thrown at Burnside when Major General Thomas L. 
Crittenden arrived and took over command of the corps’ 
First Division.41 Crittenden was another general whose 
presence threatened to upend the army’s hierarchy; his 
major general’s commission dated from July 17, 1862, four 
months before George Meade.42 By assigning Crittenden to 
the independent Ninth Corps, the matter of commissions 
were avoided, but Crittenden had other baggage he brought 
along. In the Chickamauga Campaign in the early fall of 
1863 Crittenden had commanded the Army of the 
Cumberland’s Twenty-First Corps, totaling almost 11,000 
infantrymen.43 With his defeat at Chickamauga, William S. 
Rosecrans looked for scapegoats, and one of those men was 
Crittenden. In late January of 1864, a court of inquiry was 
established to “investigate the conduct of” three generals, 
including Crittenden.44 Over the next twenty-one days the 
court heard testimony and examined the Battle of 
Chickamauga in detail before it absolved Crittenden and 
wrote, “The evidence… respecting General Crittenden’s 
operations… not only shows no cause for censure, but, on 
the contrary, that his whole conduct was most 
creditable….”45 Though absolved, the court was still a stain 
                                                          
41 OR, Vol. 36, pt. 1, 909.  
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on Crittenden, and whereas he had commanded close to 
11,000 troops at Chickamauga, his First Division command 
in the Ninth Corps now only tallied about 2,100.46 
 With poor maps, a tired and soaked corps, and a 
new division commander with only a couple of hours’ 
experience in command, Ambrose Burnside prepared his 
attack in the early morning hours of Thursday, May 12, 
1864. According to orders, Robert Potter’s Second Division 
left their works around four in the morning and began to 
slide north, looking to link up with Hancock’s Second 
Corps. By punctually ordering Potter’s division up, Gordon 
C. Rhea says Burnside was “displaying unaccustomed 
vigor”, but Burnside biographer William Marvel would 
disagree with this assessment, writing “Burnside had never 
had much trouble holding up his end of a schedule 
before[.]”47 Either way, Potter’s force of about 5,700 men 
crashed through the woods and struck the eastern salient of 
the Mule Shoe just minutes after Hancock’s men had 
completely shattered the top of it.48 The Confederate 
defenders of the tip of the salient were almost all captured 
en masse, leaving Hancock’s men with some 2,700 
prisoners to take care of.49 However, the success also came 
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with problems. An officer in Hancock’s corps wrote that, 
“All line and formation was now lost…Amid the wild 
confusion of the glorious success, it was difficult to 
preserve order.”50 In this confused melee, Potter’s three 
brigades hit below Hancock and got some of their own 
spoils, including two captured cannon.51 
 The confusion of the Federal breakthrough assisted 
the Confederate response immensely. Gathering his brigade 
of almost 2,000 North Carolinians, James Lane pushed up 
to the edge of the salient. As other Confederate brigades, 
mostly from Ewell’s Second Corps, were hitting Hancock, 
Lane focused his attention on Potter’s men. His five 
regiments in tow, Lane moved forward and later wrote, “In 
the best of spirits the brigade welcomed the furious assault, 
which soon followed, with prolonged cheers and death 
dealing volleys[.]”52 
 Lane’s men were soon joined by the combined 
weight of the 2,500 men present in Alfred Scales’ and 
Edward Thomas’ brigades.  The three Confederate brigades 
soon proved too much for Potter’s men and the Federals 
gave ground, even giving up the two cannon they had 
captured earlier. Potter wrote in his report, “The connection 
on our right with the Second Corps being broken… we 
were forced out of the enemy’s work with a few prisoners.” 
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By 8:00 AM Potter’s men were out of their breach and 
spent the rest of the day trading shots with the rebels to 
their immediate front as well as small sorties against the 
rebel works which accomplished little.53 
 As Burnside tried to get a handle on the fighting to 
his front, Grant pushed him to send more troops in. 
Increasingly frustrated at his commander’s impatience, 
Burnside crumpled up and threw on the ground one 
dispatch and, at another demand, verbally snapped at 
Comstock. The firing continued at its heaviest near the 
western salient of the Mule Shoe, which would soon get its 
infamous name of the Bloody Angle. Hoping to help, 
Burnside ordered more attacks, this time not at the eastern 
salient, but at the rebel positions further south—at Heth’s 
Salient.54  
 Thomas Crittenden’s First Division was picked for 
this task, and its two brigades began to advance through the 
swampy ravines and bottomlands, crashing through the 
woods closer and closer to Heth’s line. But with 
Crittenden’s newness to the division, combind with the two 
brigades’ near-total exhaustion, the fighting formation did 
not make it far. As the Federals stumbled towards Heth’s 
Salient, the Confederates behind their works readied their 
rifles. The rebels in these works belonged to the two 
brigades of Joseph Davis and Robert Mayo, who together 
had about 2,300 men. As soon as Crittenden’s men came 
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into view, the two brigades opened fire. Heth, who 
ironically had been roommates with Burnside at West 
Point, wrote, “[Crittenden’s] attack was met with firmness 
and repelled with gallantry. The enemy left many dead and 
wounded in our front. A stand of colors was captured 
during this affair….”55 Adding to his rather stoic report, 
Heth allowed himself some more prose in his memoirs, 
where he added, “On the [12th] of May my breastworks 
[were] vigorously assailed by General Burnside… the 
attacking force, or some of them, came within thirty paces 
of my breastworks; at the same time my infantry poured a 
shower of lead into Burnside’s troops. They were exposed 
to a raking fire of my artillery on my right, where I had 
some twenty pieces in position.”56 
 Crittenden’s repulse left Burnside with only 
Orlando Willcox’s division. The corps’ Third Division 
moved off towards the salient, hoping to break through in 
one-last attempt. With the fighting at the Bloody Angle 
having descended into a maddened killing spree of little 
overall importance, Burnside’s ultimate objective was to 
break through Heth’s Salient, forcing Lee to move men 
away from the Mule Shoe, potentially opening the door to a 
final Federal success. Willcox’s two brigades moved off in 
the same fashion as Crittenden, whose disjointed fragments 
also tried to join the attack. Joining the infantry were four 
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batteries of guns under the Ninth Corps Chief of Artillery, 
Lieutenant Samuel Benjamin.57 As Willcox’s two brigades, 
under John Hartranft and Benjamin Christ, advanced they 
soon came under the same fire that had met Crittenden’s 
division, together with an added thrust—a Confederate 
counter-attack of two brigades, centered against Willcox’s 
left and aimed straight at the four batteries of artillery. 
 Looking to do the exact same thing as Grant, but in 
reverse, Robert E. Lee looked to take pressure off the Mule 
Shoe, and saw the easiest way to do so would be to hit the 
Federal left—Burnside’s corps. Willcox’s attack was timed 
almost perfectly to the same moment that the Confederate 
attack struck out from the right flank of Heth’s Salient. The 
two brigades belonged to David Weisiger and James Lane, 
the latter having already repulsed Robert Potter earlier in 
the morning. As Lane’s men led the attack, though, they 
“commenced yelling too soon and drew upon themselves a 
terrible fire of canister from four of the guns…”58 
 The fighting around Benjamin’s batteries descended 
into chaos. Willcox wrote in his diary, “At one time the 
enemy was within ten paces, but the 2nd Michigan, 
supporting this battery, re-manned the guns and with the 
aid of canister of the other batteries, repulsed the charge 
splendidly.”59 While the fighting swirled about the 
batteries, the musketry from within Heth’s Salient 
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continued to hit Willcox’s brigades from the front, and 
Willcox noted that “my front line suffered severely in 
killed, wounded, and prisoners….”60 Especially caught in 
the middle, not only by the fire to their front, but also by 
Weisiger’s and Lane’s counter-attack, the 17th Michigan 
nearly ceased to exist—“only four dozen men escaped.”61 
Though it was able to repulse Weisiger and Lane, 
Willcox’s division’s attack was spent before it really got a 
chance to get underway. The attack slunk back to its 
defensive works, ending, for all practical purposes, the 
fighting around Heth’s Salient on May 12.  
 So ended Ambrose Burnside’s attacks on May 12 at 
Spotsylvania. Strategically, why were they important? In 
his memoirs, Grant perhaps expressed it best when he 
wrote, “Burnside accomplished but little of a positive 
nature, but negatively a great deal. He kept Lee from 
reinforcing his [center] from that quarter.”62 In other words, 
Burnside’s attacks kept portions of three Confederate 
divisions (Heth, Cadmus Wilcox, and William Mahone) 
away from the Mule Shoe—troops that could have been 
used to tip the balance and completely evict the Federal 
breakthrough. Others, however, were not so willing to see 
what Burnside had accomplished. Only knowing that 
Burnside failed to break Heth’s line, a staff officer in the 
                                                          
60 Willcox, Forgotten Valor, 521. 
61Marvel, Burnside, 365.  
62 Grant, Memoirs, 554.  
Burnside and Spotsylvania 
101 
 
Sixth Corps wrote that Burnside was a “[damned] 
humbug.”63 
 It is difficult to get an understanding of the casualty 
counts for the Ninth Corps as well as the Confederates from 
the fighting near Heth’s Salient. In his report, Burnside 
claimed that the corps had lost 1,500 killed, wounded, and 
captured, but that figure also included losses in the days 
following May 12. Confederate counts encompass the 
entirety of the Battle of Spotsylvania Court House, which 
for Henry Heth, meant stand-up fights against the Second 
Corps in the days before fighting against Burnside. For the 
entire battle, Heth’s division suffered 350 casualties, while 
Lane’s brigade, which seemed to be everywhere on May 
12, claimed 470 casualties for the day.64  
 Had Burnside broken through at Heth’s Salient, it 
would have broken open Lee’s line. After the collapse of 
the Mule Shoe, Lee had his engineers, joined by soldiers 
who were routed from the initial clash there work 
feverishly on a fallback line, digging into the wet earth with 
“pick and shovel.”65 However, that fallback line ran along 
with, and incorporated Heth’s Salient. Had any of 
Burnside’s attacks broken through, the entirety of the new 
line would be useless as the Ninth Corps came crashing 
down onto the unfinished trench system. From there, Lee’s 
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options and his defensive nature against Grant would have 
been severely limited. 
 But Burnside did not break through. He did not 
break through because of the actions of the Confederates at 
Heth’s Salient, who held steady in the face of three separate 
attacks, and even managed their own attack that sent 
Willcox’s division sprawling back in confusion. Any 
discussion of what might have been beyond this is mere 
conjecture and opinion. For all the damage done, the 
bloodletting was not over. The armies would move steadily 
south, all the way to Petersburg, where a mine, an 
explosion, and a bloody crater waited for Major General 
Ambrose Burnside. 
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Brianna E. Kirk 
 
“Popular understanding of treason, not legal 
definitions in civil courts, guided actions by Union 
functionaries, both high and low, throughout the Union and 
Confederacy,” argues William A. Blair. Popular 
conceptions of treason – widely shared definitions of 
loyalty and disloyalty – merged with governmental policy 
and the military to determine the punishment of traitors 
both during and after the Civil War. Blair adds a flavor of 
localism to the traditional narrative of treason in the mid-
nineteenth century in his newest book With Malice Toward 
Some, demonstrating that treason did in fact pervade public 
discourse during the American Civil War. Blair argues that 
the definition of treason arose more through a collaboration 
amongst loyal citizens, than top-down policies.  
Though it is the only crime defined in the United 
States Constitution, Blair observes, the Founders 
purposefully made a treason conviction hard to come by. 
Since the U.S. had scant precedent regarding how to 
address a treasonous offense, Union leaders pulled on 
international law and foreign examples to guide them on 
how to treat Confederates as “public enemies” without 
relinquishing them a traitor’s punishment, with all three 
branches of the government collectively reaching a 
consensus on how to define and handle treason. 
 An interesting section of Blair’s book, and one that 
is receiving more attention from scholars, is a chapter that 
focuses on the military as an integral part in defining 
treason and enforcing loyalty. “Many hands beyond the 
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federal government contributed to the campaign against 
disloyalty,” he writes. Members of the Union army opposed 
treasonous language and often arrested ‘traitors’ based on 
popular definitions of disloyalty – sometimes before higher 
officials in the Lincoln administration could make an 
official decision whether to support their action. The Union 
military influence was also felt in elections, where Blair 
persuasively claims that they “left a heavy footprint” 
through the supervision of test oaths and oversight of the 
ballots to ensure that those deemed disloyal could not vote, 
especially in the borders states. Taken together, the arrests 
and prosecution of disloyal people and the intimidation 
faced at the ballot boxes lends the question as to whether 
the military was working to “stifle political opposition,” or 
simply enforce loyalty. It was such interactions between 
soldiers and civilians that determined the “tempo” of 
loyalty in Civil War America. 
 Blair’s analysis of the Northern desire to define, 
locate, and punish treason culminates into the most 
compelling and perplexing question of his study: Why did 
the North not hang rebels at the war’s end? Despite 
Northern outrage over the crimes committed against the 
Union, no Confederates faced trial, punishment, or 
execution for treason. Public debates over whether to seek 
retribution against Confederate leaders like Jefferson Davis 
delayed their punishment, and the complexity of 
Reconstruction issues and politics took priority. The federal 
government worried that pursuing treason trials for top 
Confederates would not result in the desired convictions. In 
addition, if rebels like Davis were found guilty of treason 
and executed so soon after Appomattox, the Federal 
government feared that they would be consecrated as 
martyrs. Blair reminds us that even though Confederates 
did not face the gallows, they received punishment in other 
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forms. One of the most well-known of these was 
Fourteenth Amendment, which robbed former Confederates 
of their political and economic power in the newly rejoined 
Union. 
 William Blair convincingly documents conceptions 
of loyalty and disloyalty in nineteenth century America, 
providing the topic of treason with the comprehensive 
analysis that Civil War scholarship needed. Drawing from a 
large source base of primary and secondary material, the 
amount of research put into the study is evident on every 
page. It is a bottom-up history of the complexities of 
defining treason and loyalty in the Civil War North that is 
driven by archives, a crucial aspect to the book’s success, 
and is informed by military and legal history. Blair’s great 
strength is that he does not approach the topic through a 
narrow collection of specific examples, but rather 
demonstrates how definitions of treason and loyalty were 
constantly in flux in Northern society. Although Blair’s 
work is an important contribution to the historiography of 
the American Civil War, there is still more to be written 
about treason and loyalty in the Civil War era. Other 
scholars, especially cultural historians, can draw from 
Blair’s work to delve deeper into the meaning of treason 
and loyalty to see how these ideas and behaviors 
intersected and interacted in post-war society.  
Until then, Blair’s captivating study serves its 
purpose as a key intervention in the field, revealing that 
while many wanted to follow Lincoln’s idea to act merciful 
toward the Confederacy, others were all too aware that the 
war could have ended with Southern victory. Unprepared to 
extend a forgiving hand to traitorous rebels, they wanted to 
set a precedent and send a clear message to future 
generations of Americans – that there could be mercy for 
many, but malice toward some. 
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